Fiala and Husovec (2018)
|Fiala and Husovec (2018)|
|Title:||Using Experimental Evidence to Design Optimal Notice and Takedown Process|
|Author(s):||Lenka Fiala, Martin Hosovec|
|Citation:||Fiala, L. and Husovec, M. (2018) Using Experimental Evidence to Design Optimal Notice and Takedown Process (July 23, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3218286|
|Key Related Studies:|
|About the Data|
|Data Description:||The study uses an experimental model in the form of a sequential game (styled as a maze), with yes/no answers. There is a “provider” (who analyses the maze under a strict time limit) and “creator” (who has longer time to evaluate, and is ultimately the party who suffers any losses as determined by the provider). This model emulates the notice-and-takedown relationship, with further stages assessing the effectiveness of punishing the provider, revising decisions, and complaints procedures. The model was tested on 80 participants, with the aim of demonstrating that an independent alternative dispute resolution mechanism is the most effective way of resolving issues with notice-and-takedown procedures.|
|Data Type:||Primary data|
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|Data Analysis Methods:|
|Cross Country Study?:||No|
|Government or policy study?:||No|
|Time Period(s) of Collection:||
“Whether it is copyright infringement or hate speech, Internet intermediaries like Facebook, Twitter or YouTube are expected to enforce the law by removing illegal content. The legal scheme under which a lot of such delegated enforcement takes place is often referred to as notice & takedown. According to theory and empirical evidence, this scheme leads to many false positives due to over-notification by concerned parties, over-compliance by providers, and under-assertion of rights by affected content creators. We re-create these problems in a laboratory and then test a mechanism to address two of them: the over-compliance by providers, and the lack of complaints by the content creators. We show that our proposed solution of an independent ADR mechanism significantly reduces over-compliance by providers. At the same time, it increases complaints by the content creators who are successful in their complaints, but primarily in cases in which it is easier to evaluate who is right.”
Main Results of the Study
The baseline model of notice-and-takedown (as it exists in it’s current form) resulted in nearly half of all decisions by providers being incorrect. Furthermore, creators who challenged these decisions quickly found that this mechanism was ineffective (as providers would not change their decision), and thereafter became apathetic. In combination, this model resulted in disproportionate over-enforcement and loss of profits for the creator.
Upon introducing an alternative dispute mechanism option to the model, mistakes are demonstrably lower (reducing from 35% to 19%), which the authors ascribe to the “credible threat” of independent review. In this model, creators are also more likely to punish and complain to providers, with nearly all of the unsuccessful complaints being referred to alternative dispute resolution (94%). Consequently, and where the referral finds incorrect decisions, the number of mistakes by providers are lowered further (10%).
Policy Implications as Stated By Author
The authors suggest that, based on the success of the alternative dispute resolution model, a similar independent complaints mechanism should be introduced by law. They note that, as fees may be considerable, an NGO or governmental body could fund (fully or partially) the new mechanism in order to incentivise creators.