Sprigman (2017)

From Copyright EVIDENCE

Advertising Architectural Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing Programming and broadcasting Computer programming Computer consultancy Creative, arts and entertainment Cultural education

Film and motion pictures Sound recording and music publishing Photographic activities PR and communication Software publishing (including video games) Specialised design Television programmes Translation and interpretation

1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)? 3. Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors) 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption) 5. Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)

A. Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right) B. Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction) C. Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing) D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability) E. Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts) F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Source Details

Sprigman (2017)
Title: Copyright and Creative Incentives: What we Know (And Don’t)
Author(s): Sprigman, C. J.
Year: 2017
Citation: Sprigman, C.J. (2017) Copyright and Creative Incentives: What we Know (And Don’t). Houston Law Review, Vol. 55, No.2 , 451-478
Link(s): Open Access
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About the Data
Data Description: This study is comprised of a literature review of empirical evidence from natural and laboratory-style experiments.
Data Type: Secondary data
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Cross Country Study?: Yes
Comparative Study?: No
Literature review?: Yes
Government or policy study?: No
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Abstract

The dominant justification for copyright in the United States is consequentialist. Without copyright, it is claimed, copyists will compete away the profits from new artistic and literary creativity, thereby suppressing incentives to create new artistic and literary works in the first place.

This is a sensible theory. But is it true? On that question, we have little evidence. This Article examines some of the empirical work examining the link between copyright and the incentive to create new works. The Article introduces readers to a sampling of the existing empirical work, which includes event studies (aka, natural experiments), qualitative studies of creativity undertaken in so-called “low-IP” settings, and laboratory experiments. At this early point in the empirical study of copyright, the link between copyright and creative incentives appears to be considerably less robust than theory may have led us to expect.

This Article is adapted from a talk given at the University of Houston Law Center’s Institute for Intellectual Property and Information Law Spring Lecture (presented March 30, 2017).

Main Results of the Study

The article investigates the existing empirical evidence on the relationship between copyright law and creative incentives. There are three primary conclusions:• Firstly, of the natural experiments surveyed, there appears to be a link with high cost contexts (e.g. movies and operas), but not low cost contexts (e.g. music).• Secondly, in terms of “negative space” scholarship (including fashion, comedy, and adult entertainment), there are indicators of increasing trends in the importance of performance and experience factors over the products themselves.• Lastly, the results of laboratory-style experiments suggest that the structure of creativity incentives is important. Similarly, using subjective incentives appear to have more impact on creativity than objective incentives.

Policy Implications as Stated By Author

• Based on the Giorcelli and Moser study, the author concludes that copyright terms, at least in the United States, are too lengthy to encourage the spread of knowledge and creative incentives. • The author also states that, given the literature surveyed, any policy solutions to the problem of creative incentives are unlikely to be straightforward.



Coverage of Study

Coverage of Fundamental Issues
Issue Included within Study
Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare
Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?
Green-tick.png
Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors)
Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption)
Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)
Coverage of Evidence Based Policies
Issue Included within Study
Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right)
Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction)
Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing)
Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability)
Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts)
Green-tick.png
Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Datasets

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