Aguilar (2019a)

Source Details

Aguilar (2019a)
Title:	The collective management of performers’ rights in the UK: a story of competing interests
Author(s):	Aguilar, A.
Year:	2019
Citation:	Aguilar, A. (2019) The collective management of performers’ rights in the UK: a story of competing interests. Scripted 16(1) DOI: 10.2966/scrip.160119.4
Link(s):	Open Access
Key Related Studies:	Hviid, Schroff and Street (2017) Aguilar (2019)
Discipline:	O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
Linked by:

About the Data
Data Description:	The study uses a mix of qualitative and ethnographic methods to gather data, including 33 interviews with performers, 15 interviews with government representatives, 2 interviews with performer representatives, email and phone data from PPL members, and immersion in PPL industry events and system interface (including e.g. newsletters and website).
Data Type:	Primary and Secondary data
Secondary Data Sources:
Data Collection Methods:	Case Study Ethnography Semi-Structured Interview
Data Analysis Methods:	Qualitative Analysis Methods Qualitative Coding / Sorting (e.g. of interview data)
Industry(ies):	Sound recording and music publishing
Country(ies):	UK
Cross Country Study?:	No
Comparative Study?:	No
Literature review?:	No
Government or policy study?:	No
Time Period(s) of Collection:	2014-2016
Funder(s):	The Leverhulme Trust

Abstract

“In this article I examine the experience of UK performers using collective management organisation PPL, a UK CMO established by record companies that also manages the rights of performers. I consider the effect of the regulatory framework on the provision of transparency to PPL’s performer members by drawing on primary sources including interviews with performers, PPL’s regulation and its public-facing material. I demonstrate that PPL marshals social, financial, legal and technological resources to prioritise the interests of record companies over those of performers. Considering that the current legal framework supports PPL’s actions, I discuss two alternatives: i) tightening regulation of individual CMOs whilst respecting their monopoly status, and ii) opening up the sector to competition. Despite difficulties faced by performers vis-à-vis PPL, I ultimately side with a large body of literature suggesting that performers are best off in an environment that supports CMO’s monopoly status.However, in an environment where regulators resist tightening regulation, performers are forced to support a competitive market for CMOs.”

Main Results of the Study

The study finds that musicians continue to demonstrate ignorance about the existence of performers’ rights. Interviewees report a low uptake on PPL membership, with only 24% being members and and 33% reporting never knowing of its existence. The author attributes this to a tendency for performers to view their work as a service rather than a product to be owned.

Re-distributed payments from PPL tend to be paid to record companies and a minority of featured artists. Registered members report receiving less compensation through PPL than other systems such as e.g. PRS. Other reported issues include the need for registration, the licensing of samples, participation in the Annual Performer Meeting and ring-fencing of non-distributed monies.

Policy Implications as Stated By Author

The study offers two suggestions as to how to strengthen the management of performers’ legal rights:

• Tighter regulation at CMO level, including safeguards for membership status and improvements to alternative dispute mechanisms.

• Introduce further competition into the licensing market by giving creators a choice of CMO (effectively forcing CMOs to improve their practice).

The study also suggests improving knowledge about performers’ rights more generally through education.

Coverage of Study

Coverage of Fundamental Issues

Issue	Included within Study
Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare
Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?
Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors)
Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption)
Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)

Coverage of Evidence Based Policies

Issue	Included within Study
Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right)
Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction)
Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing)
Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability)
Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts)
Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Datasets

Sample size:	33
Level of aggregation:	Individual
Period of material under study:	2014-2016

Sample size:	15
Level of aggregation:	Governmental Representatives
Period of material under study:	2014-2016

Sample size:	2
Level of aggregation:	Company
Period of material under study:	2014-2016