Difference between revisions of "Erickson and Kretschmer (2019)"

From Copyright EVIDENCE
(Created page with "{{MainSource |Source={{Source |Name of Study=Erickson and Kretschmer (2019) |Author=Erickson, K.; Kretschmer, M.; |Title=Empirical Approaches to Intermediary Liability |Year=2...")
 
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|Name of Study=Erickson and Kretschmer (2019)
 
|Name of Study=Erickson and Kretschmer (2019)
|Author=Erickson, K.; Kretschmer, M.;
 
 
|Title=Empirical Approaches to Intermediary Liability
 
|Title=Empirical Approaches to Intermediary Liability
 
|Year=2019
 
|Year=2019
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|Link=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3400230
 
|Link=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3400230
 
|Reference=Urban and Quilter (2006);Seng (2014);Cotropia and Gibson (2016);Urban, Karaganis and Schofield (2017a);Erickson and Kretschmer (2018)
 
|Reference=Urban and Quilter (2006);Seng (2014);Cotropia and Gibson (2016);Urban, Karaganis and Schofield (2017a);Erickson and Kretschmer (2018)
|Plain Text Proposition=Based on a review of available literature, there are five key strands of empirical inquiry into notice-and-takedown systems: the volume of takedown requests, the accuracy of notices, the potential for over-enforcement or abuse, transparency of the takedown process, and the costs of enforcement borne by different parties.  Having surveyed the literature available, the study concludes that “despite its flaws, the notice-and-takedown regime is working. Rightholders make effective use of the notice-and-takedown system which has dramatically accelerated with the use of automated systems since about 2012. The potential for abuse, while real, it likely over-stated. The distribution of cost burdens creates incentives for rightholders to pursue instances of straight piracy, while user-generated re-use remains largely tolerated.
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|Plain Text Proposition=Based on a review of available literature, there are five key strands of empirical inquiry into notice-and-takedown systems: the volume of takedown requests, the accuracy of notices, the potential for over-enforcement or abuse, transparency of the takedown process, and the costs of enforcement borne by different parties.  <br><br>Having surveyed the literature available, the study concludes that “despite its flaws, the notice-and-takedown regime is working. Rightholders make effective use of the notice-and-takedown system which has dramatically accelerated with the use of automated systems since about 2012. The potential for abuse, while real, it likely over-stated. The distribution of cost burdens creates incentives for rightholders to pursue instances of straight piracy, while user-generated re-use remains largely tolerated.
 
|FundamentalIssue=4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption)
 
|FundamentalIssue=4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption)
 
|EvidenceBasedPolicy=F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)
 
|EvidenceBasedPolicy=F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Revision as of 12:15, 5 November 2019

Advertising Architectural Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing Programming and broadcasting Computer programming Computer consultancy Creative, arts and entertainment Cultural education Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities

Film and motion pictures Sound recording and music publishing Photographic activities PR and communication Software publishing Video game publishing Specialised design Television programmes Translation and interpretation

1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)? 3. Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors) 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption) 5. Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)

A. Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right) B. Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction) C. Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing) D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability) E. Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts) F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Source Details

Erickson and Kretschmer (2019)
Title: Empirical Approaches to Intermediary Liability
Author(s):
Year: 2019
Citation: Erickson, K. And Kretschmer, M. (2019) Empirical Approaches to Intermediary Liability in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY ONLINE (ed. Giancarlo Frosio), Oxford University Press, Forthcoming
Link(s): Open Access
Key Related Studies:
Discipline:
Linked by:
About the Data
Data Description: The study consists of a literature review of empirical studies relating to notice-and-takedown systems. Drawing on an initial sample of empirical studies featured on the Copyright Evidence Wiki, the study then uses a snowball sampling method to identify further published research.
Data Type: Secondary data
Secondary Data Sources:
Data Collection Methods:
Data Analysis Methods:
Industry(ies):
Country(ies):
Cross Country Study?: Yes
Comparative Study?: No
Literature review?: No
Government or policy study?: No
Time Period(s) of Collection:
  • 1998-2018
Funder(s):

Abstract

“Legal theory has failed to offer a convincing framework for the analysis of the responsibilities of online intermediaries. The debate is characterised by a wide range of contested issues. This paper considers what empirical evidence may contribute to these debates. What do we need to know in order to frame the liability of intermediaries and, a forteriori, what does the relationship between theory and empirics imply for the wider issue of platform regulation? The core of the paper is a systematic review of existing empirical research on the copyright liability regime established with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA 1998) and the EU E-Commerce Directive (2000). Issues examined include the number and accuracy of takedown notices, over-enforcement and abuse, transparency and due process, and finally the allocation of responsibilities and costs.”

Main Results of the Study

Based on a review of available literature, there are five key strands of empirical inquiry into notice-and-takedown systems: the volume of takedown requests, the accuracy of notices, the potential for over-enforcement or abuse, transparency of the takedown process, and the costs of enforcement borne by different parties.

Having surveyed the literature available, the study concludes that “despite its flaws, the notice-and-takedown regime is working. Rightholders make effective use of the notice-and-takedown system which has dramatically accelerated with the use of automated systems since about 2012. The potential for abuse, while real, it likely over-stated. The distribution of cost burdens creates incentives for rightholders to pursue instances of straight piracy, while user-generated re-use remains largely tolerated.

Policy Implications as Stated By Author

The study recommends “tweaking, rather than overhauling” the notice-and-takedown regime. Improvements may be made by rightsholders and platforms in regards accountability and transparency in order to promote due process. Delegating regulatory functions (such as filtering and monitoring) to platforms themselves remains risky due to a lack of oversight over e.g. platforms AI and machine learning processes.



Coverage of Study

Coverage of Fundamental Issues
Issue Included within Study
Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare
Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?
Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors)
Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption)
Green-tick.png
Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)
Coverage of Evidence Based Policies
Issue Included within Study
Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right)
Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction)
Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing)
Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability)
Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts)
Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)
Green-tick.png

Datasets

{{{Dataset}}}