Difference between revisions of "Fauchart and Hippel (2006)"

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|Authentic Link=http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/orsc.1070.0314?journalCode=orsc
 
|Authentic Link=http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/orsc.1070.0314?journalCode=orsc
 
|Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=881781
 
|Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=881781
|Reference=Allen, R. C. (1983). “Collective Invention.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 4(1): 1-24.Axlerod, Robert. (1986) An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4. pp. 1095-1111.Bendor, Jonathan and Piotr Swistak (2001), The Evolution of Norms. American Journal of Sociology; Vol. 106 Issue 6, pp 1493 – 1545.Bernstein Lisa (1992) “Opting out of the legal system: extralegal contractual relations in the diamond industry” Journal of Legal Studies, 21, p. 115-157.Bouty, Isabelle (2000) Interpersonal and Interaction Influences on Informal Resource Exchanges Between R&D Researchers Across Organizational Boundaries, Academy of Management Journal, Vol 43, No.1, pp 50-65.Dasgupta, P. and P. A. David (1994). “Toward a New Economics of Science.” Policy Research 23: 487-521.Elster, Jon (1989) “Social Norms and Economic Theory” The Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol 3 No. 4 Autumn pp. 99-117.Feldman, Daniel (1984) The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 47-53.Gibbs, Jack (1965), Norms: The Problem of Definition and Classification, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 70, No. 5 pp. 586-594.Greif, Avner (1993) “Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade : the Maghribi traders’ coalition”, AER, vol.83, no. 3 (June)Hall, B. H. and D. Harhoff (2004). “Post Grant Review Systems at the U.S. Patent Office: Design Parameters and Expected Impact.” Berkeley Law Technology JournalHansmann, Henry and Marina Santilli (1997) “Authors and Artists Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis.” Journal of Legal Studies vol 26, (January) pp. 95-143.Harhoff, D., J. Henkel and E. von Hippel (2003). “Profiting from Voluntary Information Spillovers: How Users Benefit by Freely Revealing their Innovations.” Research Policy 32(10): 1753-1769.Johnson, C. B., Surlemont, P. Nicod, and F.Revaz (2005) "Behind the stars : a concise typology of Michelin restaurants in Europe," Cornell Quarterly, May.Kreiner, Kristian and Majken Schultz (1993) “Informal Collaboration in R&D. The Formation of Networks Across Organizations.” Organization Studies, 14/2, 189-209.Lerner, J. and J. Tirole (2002). “Some Simple Economics of Open Source.” Journal of Industrial Economics 50(2): 197-234.Macaulay S. (1963) “Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study”, American Sociological Review, Vol.28, No. 55.Merges, Robert (1996a) “Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual property rights and collective rights organizations” Californial Law Review 84 (October) p. 1293-1393Merges, R.(1996b) "Property Rights and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research," Social Philosophy & Policy vol. 13, 145-53.Rai, Arti Kaur (1999) Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science Northwestern University Law Review Vol 94, No. 1 (Fall) pp. 77-152.Raustiala, Kal and Christopher Sprigman (2006) “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design,” Virginia Law Review Vol. 92, No. 8 (December) pp. 1687-1777. (Eric to add to lit review)Rimal, Rajiv and Kevin Real (2003) “Understanding the Influence of Perceived Norms on Behaviors” Communication Theory; 13:184-203Rosamond, Ben (2002), “Plagiarism, Academic Norms and the Governance of the Profession,” Politics, Vol 22, 3, (September), pp. 167-174(8)Schrader, Stephan (1991) " Informal technology transfer between firms: Cooperation through information trading" Research Policy 20 :153-169.von Hippel, Eric (1987) "Cooperation Between Rivals: Informal Know-How Trading," Research Policy 16: 291-302.Walsh, John P., Charlene Cho, and Wesley M. Cohen (2005) “View from the Bench: Patents and Materials Transfers,” Science vol 309 (23 September) pp. 2002-3.
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|Reference=Allen (1983); Bernstein (1992); Rosamond (2002); Strandbourg (2008);
 
|Plain Text Proposition=Main results of study:
 
|Plain Text Proposition=Main results of study:
  
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|FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare,
 
|FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare,
 
|EvidenceBasedPolicy=D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability),
 
|EvidenceBasedPolicy=D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability),
|Discipline=A: General Economics and Teaching, A1: General Economics, A14: Sociology of Economics, K: Law and Economics, K1: Basic Areas of Law, K11: Property Law
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|Discipline=A: General Economics and Teaching, A1: General Economics, A14: Sociology of Economics, K: Law and Economics, K1: Basic Areas of Law, K11: Property Law, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
 
|Intervention-Response=Policy implications:
 
|Intervention-Response=Policy implications:
  
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|Cross-country=No
 
|Cross-country=No
 
|Comparative=No
 
|Comparative=No
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|Government or policy=No
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|Literature review=No
 
|Funded By=None stated;
 
|Funded By=None stated;
 
|Method=Mixed methods, interviews, survey
 
|Method=Mixed methods, interviews, survey

Revision as of 08:18, 23 August 2015

Advertising Architectural Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing Programming and broadcasting Computer programming Computer consultancy Creative, arts and entertainment Cultural education

Film and motion pictures Sound recording and music publishing Photographic activities PR and communication Software publishing (including video games) Specialised design Television programmes Translation and interpretation

1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)? 3. Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors) 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption) 5. Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)

A. Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right) B. Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction) C. Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing) D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability) E. Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts) F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Source Details

Fauchart and Hippel (2008)
Title: Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs
Author(s): Fauchart, E., von Hippel, E.
Year: 2008
Citation: Fauchart, E., & Von Hippel, E. (2008). Norms-based intellectual property systems: The case of French chefs. Organization Science, 19(2), 187-201.
Link(s): Definitive , Open Access
Key Related Studies:
Discipline:
Linked by: Loshin (2007)
About the Data
Data Description: Data was collected in two phases:
  • First, the authors conducted grounded field research to identify important social norms dealing with recipe-related IP.
  • Second, they conducted a quantitative, questionnaire-based study to determine whether innovators deployed social norms to gain private economic advantage and whether violators of the norms were in fact sanctioned by accomplished haute cuisine chefs.
  • The samples for both studies consisted of the chefs de cuisine in restaurants that had received “stars” and/or “forks” from the Michelin guide as a sign of culinary excellence.
  • In the first phase, requests for a meeting were made to 12 chefs, and 10 responded positively. Seven of these were interviewed face to face, and three were inter- viewed by email. Seven of the 10 chefs interviewed had Michelin stars. Three had no stars but were listed in the Michelin guide as chefs de cuisine in “good gastronomic restaurants.”
  • In the second phase, questionnaires were sent to chefs who had been recognized in the Michelin guide. These included chefs holding stars, “rising stars,” and chefs holding from 2 to 5 forks. Of 485 questionnaires sent, 104 were returned, a response rate of 21.4%. Of these, 10 contained essentially no data and so were not included in our analyses. The 94 analyzable questionnaires were reasonably well distributed across the expertise categories in the Michelin guide: 7% came from two-star chefs, 62% from one- star chefs, 3% from rising stars, and 28% from chefs awarded forks.
Data Type: Primary data
Secondary Data Sources:
Data Collection Methods:
Data Analysis Methods:
Industry(ies):
Country(ies):
Cross Country Study?: No
Comparative Study?: No
Literature review?: No
Government or policy study?: No
Time Period(s) of Collection:
  • Not stated.
Funder(s):
  • None stated

Abstract

In this paper we propose that “norms-based” intellectual property systems exist today, and are an important complement to or substitute for law-based intellectual property systems. Norms-based IP systems, as we define them, operate entirely upon the basis of implicit social norms that are held in common by members of a given community. Within that community, they offer functionality “similar to” contemporary law-based IP systems with respect to both the nature of rights protected and the effectiveness of protection provided.

We document the existence of a norms-based IP system among a sample of accomplished French chefs. These chefs consider recipes they develop to be a very valuable form of intellectual property. At the same time, recipes are not a form of innovation that is effectively covered by law-based intellectual property systems. Via grounded research, we identify three strong implicit social norms related to the protection of recipe IP. Via quantitative research, we find that accomplished chefs enforce these norms, and apply them in ways that enhance their private economic returns from their recipe-related IP.

In our discussion, we compare the attributes of norms-based and law-based IP systems, arguing that each has different advantages and drawbacks. We also point out that the existence of norms-based IP systems means that many “information commons” may prove to be criss-crossed by norms-based fences, with community access controlled by community IP owners.

Main Results of the Study

Main results of study:

  • Three major social norms consistently emerged in all our interviews with chefs. First, it is not honorable for chefs to exactly copy recipes developed by other chefs. Chefs were vehement about how very wrong it was to copy the recipe of a colleague.
  • The second important norm is that a chef who asks for and is given proprietary information by a colleague will not pass that information on to others without permission. This norm applies only to information that can be kept as a trade secret if not revealed. The requirement to not pass it on is important but is generally not stated when information is transferred in response to a request—it is implicit.
  • The third norm involves the right to be acknowledged as the author of a recipe one has created. This applies to a recipe that one may observe at a creator’s restaurant or ask the developer about; it also applies when the innovator publicly reveals his recipe by, for example, publishing it in a cookbook or a magazine or describing it on TV. This norm offers a functionality offered by copyright and by law on the “moral rights” of authors and artists to have the paternity of their work acknowledged.
  • The quantitative element of the research is designed to explore two matters: (1) whether the norms identified via grounded research are actually being enforced by chefs, and (2) whether chefs are enforcing the norms in a way likely to increase their private innovation-related profits.
  • IP holders were significantly more likely to deny secret IP to requesters they thought likely to violate each of the three social norms. We also found that this association was strongest when information of high value was being requested.
  • The decision to provide or withhold IP is in the hands of the chef holding that IP and is related to his or her perceptions of the attributes of the information seeker, not to the actual attributes of that person.
  • The authors found that chefs who selectively reveal recipe-related information to a colleague appear to be engaging in informal information trading rather than altruism. Chefs were more likely to present high-value recipe information in a public forum. In sharp contrast, they were significantly more likely to reveal low-value information privately to anyone who asked.
  • When asked why they would reveal some of their recipes to the public at large, the chefs tended to agree with the motives listed that clearly involved direct personal gain in the form of increased restaurant sales and enhanced personal reputations.
  • Having documented that accomplished French chefs both espouse and enforce IP-related norms, the authors conclude that a norms-based IP system exists among French chefs.

Policy Implications as Stated By Author

Policy implications:

  • If norms-based IP systems are effective and common in today’s economies, clearly a great deal of research is needed to better understand them. We propose that it will be useful to study norms-based IP systems further and to learn how they can most usefully be applied to serve both innova- tors and society.
  • In addition to research to determine the ubiquity and economic importance of norms-based IP systems, it would be very useful to understand the extent to which the norms that underlie such systems are similar.
  • It will also be useful to more deeply explore whether one system tends to dominate the other when both are present.



Coverage of Study

Coverage of Fundamental Issues
Issue Included within Study
Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare
Green-tick.png
Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?
Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors)
Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption)
Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)
Coverage of Evidence Based Policies
Issue Included within Study
Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right)
Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction)
Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing)
Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability)
Green-tick.png
Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts)
Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Datasets