Difference between revisions of "Mustonen (2005)"
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|Author=Mikko Mustonen | |Author=Mikko Mustonen | ||
|Title=When Does a Firm Support Substitute Open Source Programming? | |Title=When Does a Firm Support Substitute Open Source Programming? | ||
+ | |Full Citation=Mustonen, Mikko. When does a firm support substitute open source programming?. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 14.1 (2005): 121-139. | ||
+ | |Abstract=Software firms are observed to support programmers’ communities, which | ||
+ | develop rival open source programs. A firm selling a copyright program has an | ||
+ | incentive to support substitute copyleft programming when support creates | ||
+ | compatibility between the programs and programs exhibit network effects. | ||
+ | Costly compatibility benefits the firm as its consumers gain access to the | ||
+ | community’s services but may also hurt the firm because it cannot profit | ||
+ | from the valuation difference between incompatible networks. The incentive | ||
+ | arises under a weak network effect even when the consumers’ benefit is small. | ||
+ | Standardization and enlarging the open source programmers’ community do | ||
+ | not always increase welfare. | ||
|Authentic Link=http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2005.00036.x/abstract | |Authentic Link=http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2005.00036.x/abstract | ||
|Cross-country=No | |Cross-country=No |
Revision as of 09:58, 9 April 2016
Contents
Source Details
Mustonen (2005) | |
Title: | When Does a Firm Support Substitute Open Source Programming? |
Author(s): | Mikko Mustonen |
Year: | |
Citation: | Mustonen, Mikko. When does a firm support substitute open source programming?. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 14.1 (2005): 121-139. |
Link(s): | Definitive , |
Key Related Studies: | |
Discipline: | |
Linked by: |
About the Data | |
Data Description: | |
Data Type: | |
Secondary Data Sources: | |
Data Collection Methods: | |
Data Analysis Methods: | |
Industry(ies): | |
Country(ies): | |
Cross Country Study?: | No |
Comparative Study?: | No |
Literature review?: | No |
Government or policy study?: | No |
Time Period(s) of Collection: | |
Funder(s): |
Abstract
Software firms are observed to support programmers’ communities, which develop rival open source programs. A firm selling a copyright program has an incentive to support substitute copyleft programming when support creates compatibility between the programs and programs exhibit network effects. Costly compatibility benefits the firm as its consumers gain access to the community’s services but may also hurt the firm because it cannot profit from the valuation difference between incompatible networks. The incentive arises under a weak network effect even when the consumers’ benefit is small. Standardization and enlarging the open source programmers’ community do not always increase welfare.