Difference between revisions of "Scotchmer (2011)"
From Copyright EVIDENCE
| Line 13: | Line 13: | ||
university spending by more than the subsidy. | university spending by more than the subsidy. | ||
| − | * | + | * Because universities maximize research rather than profit, they may overspend on |
research. Direct subsidies are only optimal if commercialization is not very profitable. | research. Direct subsidies are only optimal if commercialization is not very profitable. | ||
| − | + | ||
* If direct subsidies are not optimal and not provided, then tax credits for commercialization | * If direct subsidies are not optimal and not provided, then tax credits for commercialization | ||
should be smaller than when direct subsidies are provided. | should be smaller than when direct subsidies are provided. | ||
| Line 22: | Line 22: | ||
of subsidies, and less than the research-maximizing university. | of subsidies, and less than the research-maximizing university. | ||
| − | * | + | * Direct subsidies to a profit-maximizing firm crowd out its own private spending, |
whereas direct subsidies "prime the pump" research-maximizing universities. | whereas direct subsidies "prime the pump" research-maximizing universities. | ||
|FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare, 3. Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors), 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?, | |FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare, 3. Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors), 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?, | ||
|EvidenceBasedPolicy=E. Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts), | |EvidenceBasedPolicy=E. Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts), | ||
|Discipline=O: Economic Development; Technological Change; and Growth, O3: Technological Change • Research and Development • Intellectual Property Rights, O31: Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital, Z1: Cultural Economics • Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology | |Discipline=O: Economic Development; Technological Change; and Growth, O3: Technological Change • Research and Development • Intellectual Property Rights, O31: Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital, Z1: Cultural Economics • Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology | ||
| − | |Intervention-Response=* | + | |Intervention-Response=* If the Bayh-Dole Act serves the purpose of creating funds for university research, it is because the ideas it turns up are protectable. If ideas are not protectable, the university must depend entirely on direct subsidies for its research budget. If ideas are protectable, the university earns money by commercializing ideas under the Bayh-Dole Act. |
| + | |||
| + | * Direct subsidies are only optimal if commercialization is not very profi
table. | ||
| − | * | + | * If direct subsidies are not optimal and not provided, then tax credits for commercialization should be smaller than when direct subsidies are provided. |
| − | + | |Description of Data=The subsidy policies considered below have two parts: an investment tax credit for the commercial sector, and direct subsidies to universities. The objective is to study the optimal mix of these two subsidies in the two cases that ideas are protectable or not protectable. The study presents a model of idea generation and commercialization and characterizes the optimal subsidy policy when ideas are protectable. | |
|Data Year=Not stated | |Data Year=Not stated | ||
| − | |Data Type=Primary data | + | |Data Type=Primary and Secondary data |
| − | |Method of Collection=Qualitative Collection Methods | + | |Data Source=Literature review; |
| − | |Method of Analysis= | + | |Method of Collection=Qualitative Collection Methods, Case Study |
| + | |Method of Analysis=Qualitative Analysis Methods, Grounded Theory | ||
|Industry=Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing; Cultural education; | |Industry=Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing; Cultural education; | ||
|Country=Unite States; | |Country=Unite States; | ||
| Line 40: | Line 43: | ||
|Comparative=No | |Comparative=No | ||
|Government or policy=No | |Government or policy=No | ||
| − | |Literature review= | + | |Literature review=Yes |
|Funded By=Toulouse Network on Information Technology; Alfred P. Sloan Foundation; National Science Foundation; | |Funded By=Toulouse Network on Information Technology; Alfred P. Sloan Foundation; National Science Foundation; | ||
}} | }} | ||
|Dataset={{Dataset | |Dataset={{Dataset | ||
| − | |Sample Size= | + | |Sample Size=2 |
| − | |Level of Aggregation= | + | |Level of Aggregation=Subsidy policy, |
| + | |Data Material Year=Not stated | ||
| + | }}{{Dataset | ||
| + | |Sample Size=2 | ||
| + | |Level of Aggregation=Economic model, | ||
| + | |Data Material Year=Not stated | ||
| + | }}{{Dataset | ||
| + | |Sample Size=2 | ||
| + | |Level of Aggregation=Scenario, | ||
|Data Material Year=Not stated | |Data Material Year=Not stated | ||
}} | }} | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 06:06, 8 October 2016
Contents
Source Details
| Scotchmer (2011) | |
| Title: | Ideas and Innovations: Which should be subsidized? |
| Author(s): | Scotchmer, S |
| Year: | 2011 |
| Citation: | Scotchmer, S. (2011). Ideas and Innovations: Which should be subsidized?. Available at SSRN 1755091. |
| Link(s): | Definitive , Open Access |
| Key Related Studies: | |
| Discipline: | |
| Linked by: | |
| About the Data | |
| Data Description: | The subsidy policies considered below have two parts: an investment tax credit for the commercial sector, and direct subsidies to universities. The objective is to study the optimal mix of these two subsidies in the two cases that ideas are protectable or not protectable. The study presents a model of idea generation and commercialization and characterizes the optimal subsidy policy when ideas are protectable. |
| Data Type: | Primary and Secondary data |
| Secondary Data Sources: | |
| Data Collection Methods: | |
| Data Analysis Methods: | |
| Industry(ies): | |
| Country(ies): | |
| Cross Country Study?: | No |
| Comparative Study?: | No |
| Literature review?: | Yes |
| Government or policy study?: | No |
| Time Period(s) of Collection: |
|
| Funder(s): |
|
Abstract
The Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to commercialize their research. University laboratories therefore have two sources of funds: direct grants from the government and funds from commercialization. In addition to giving direct subsidies to university laboratories, the government also subsidizes the commercial sector, for example, through tax credits. Subsidies to commerce contribute indirectly to the university's research budget, because they increase the profit from commercialization. This paper investigates the optimal mix of direct and indirect subsidies to the university, in a context where the role of university research is to turn up "ideas" for commercial investments, and the role of commerce is to turn the ideas into innovations. It also asks whether there is an argument for protecting "ideas" as well as commercializations, as is authorized by the Bayh-Dole Act.
Main Results of the Study
�* Direct subsidies to universities "prime the pump" the sense that a subsidy increases university spending by more than the subsidy.
- Because universities maximize research rather than profit, they may overspend on
research. Direct subsidies are only optimal if commercialization is not very profitable.
- If direct subsidies are not optimal and not provided, then tax credits for commercialization
should be smaller than when direct subsidies are provided.
- A profit-maximizing firm will spend less on idea generation than is optimal, regardless
of subsidies, and less than the research-maximizing university.
- Direct subsidies to a profit-maximizing firm crowd out its own private spending,
whereas direct subsidies "prime the pump" research-maximizing universities.
Policy Implications as Stated By Author
- If the Bayh-Dole Act serves the purpose of creating funds for university research, it is because the ideas it turns up are protectable. If ideas are not protectable, the university must depend entirely on direct subsidies for its research budget. If ideas are protectable, the university earns money by commercializing ideas under the Bayh-Dole Act.
- Direct subsidies are only optimal if commercialization is not very profi table.
- If direct subsidies are not optimal and not provided, then tax credits for commercialization should be smaller than when direct subsidies are provided.
Coverage of Study
Datasets
| Sample size: | 2 |
| Level of aggregation: | Subsidy policy |
| Period of material under study: | Not stated |
| Sample size: | 2 |
| Level of aggregation: | Economic model |
| Period of material under study: | Not stated |
| Sample size: | 2 |
| Level of aggregation: | Scenario |
| Period of material under study: | Not stated |
