Takeyama (1994)
From Copyright EVIDENCE
Revision as of 09:06, 7 April 2016 by Guido Noto La Diega (talk | contribs) (Saved using "Save and continue" button in form)
Contents
Source Details
| Takeyama (1994) | |
| Title: | The welfare implications of unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property in the presence of demand network externalities |
| Author(s): | Takeyama, LN |
| Year: | 1994 |
| Citation: | Takeyama, L. N. (1994). The welfare implications of unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property in the presence of demand network externalities. The journal of industrial economics, 155-166. |
| Link(s): | Definitive |
| Key Related Studies: | |
| Discipline: | |
| Linked by: | Arai and Kinukawa (2014), Banerjee, Banerjee and Raychaudhuri (2008), Hui and Png (2003), Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan (2010), Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006a), Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006b), Smith and Telang (2012), Tanaka (2004), Yoon (2002), Zamoon and Curley (2008) |
| About the Data | |
| Data Description: | |
| Data Type: | |
| Secondary Data Sources: | |
| Data Collection Methods: | |
| Data Analysis Methods: | |
| Industry(ies): | |
| Country(ies): | |
| Cross Country Study?: | No |
| Comparative Study?: | No |
| Literature review?: | No |
| Government or policy study?: | No |
| Time Period(s) of Collection: | |
| Funder(s): | |
Abstract
This paper finds that unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property in the presence of demand network externalities can not only induce greater firm profits relative to the case where there is no copying, it can lead to a Pareto improvement in social welfare. Ceteris paribus, when network externalities are present, firms have a greater incentive to expand output because marginal revenue is higher and/or they may wish to create preemptive installed bases. This paper suggests that unauthorized copying can be a relatively efficient means of achieving this by allowing the firm, in effect, to 'price discriminate' among different classes of consumers.
