Difference between revisions of "Yuan (2006)"
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|Name of Study=Yuan (2006) | |Name of Study=Yuan (2006) | ||
|Author=Michael Y. Yuan | |Author=Michael Y. Yuan | ||
− | |Title=A better copyright system? | + | |Title=A better copyright system? Comparing welfare of indefinitely renewable copyright versus fixed-length copyright |
|Year=2006 | |Year=2006 | ||
|Full Citation=Yuan, Michael Y. A better copyright system? comparing welfare of indefinitely renewable copyright versus fixed-length copyright. Econ. Innov. New Techn. 15.6 (2006): 519-542. | |Full Citation=Yuan, Michael Y. A better copyright system? comparing welfare of indefinitely renewable copyright versus fixed-length copyright. Econ. Innov. New Techn. 15.6 (2006): 519-542. | ||
|Abstract=This study models and simulates fixed-length copyright (FLC) and indefinitely renewable copyright (IRC) and compares their social welfare. Evidence is found suggesting that IRC has lower maximal social welfare than FLC does. This difference can be explained by the way copyright duration is determined. Copyright duration represents the balance between encouraging creation and reducing restrictions on the consumption of information products. Under FLC, copyright duration is chosen directly by legislation; under IRC, it is induced indirectly through a copyright fee. However, the imposition of a copyright fee distorts the behavior of creators and thus decreases social welfare. | |Abstract=This study models and simulates fixed-length copyright (FLC) and indefinitely renewable copyright (IRC) and compares their social welfare. Evidence is found suggesting that IRC has lower maximal social welfare than FLC does. This difference can be explained by the way copyright duration is determined. Copyright duration represents the balance between encouraging creation and reducing restrictions on the consumption of information products. Under FLC, copyright duration is chosen directly by legislation; under IRC, it is induced indirectly through a copyright fee. However, the imposition of a copyright fee distorts the behavior of creators and thus decreases social welfare. | ||
|Authentic Link=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10438590500284493#.Vw5226QrLIU | |Authentic Link=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10438590500284493#.Vw5226QrLIU | ||
+ | |Link=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10438590500284493#.Vw5226QrLIU | ||
|Reference=Landes and Posner (2003); Besen and Kirby (1989); | |Reference=Landes and Posner (2003); Besen and Kirby (1989); | ||
− | |Plain Text Proposition=This study models the market of information products under FLC and under IRC. The models | + | |Plain Text Proposition=This study models the market of information products under FLC and under IRC. The models describe competition in both creation and production of information products and capture the decisions on pricing, number of first-copy products, and entry of creators. The simulations showthat IRC can increase social welfare if the copyright length ofFLCis not set optimally and is within certain range of excessive length. However, if both FLC and IRC can be configured optimally, then IRC reduces social welfare. It is suggested that IRC is the third-best solution and FLC is the second-best solution to the problem of high creative cost and low reproduction cost of information products. Under FLC, copyright length is set directly to balance the needs of encouraging creation and reducing restrictions on consumption. IRC attempts to indirectly induce a copyright length through a copyright fee. However, the fee distorts the behavior of the creators. |
− | describe competition in both creation and production of information products and capture the | ||
− | decisions on pricing, number of first-copy products, and entry of creators. The simulations | ||
− | showthat IRC can increase social welfare if the copyright length ofFLCis not set optimally and | ||
− | is within certain range of excessive length. However, if both FLC and IRC can be configured | ||
− | optimally, then IRC reduces social welfare. It is suggested that IRC is the third-best solution | ||
− | and FLC is the second-best solution to the problem of high creative cost and low reproduction | ||
− | cost of information products. Under FLC, copyright length is set directly to balance the needs | ||
− | of encouraging creation and reducing restrictions on consumption. IRC attempts to indirectly | ||
− | induce a copyright length through a copyright fee. However, the fee distorts the behavior of | ||
− | the creators. | ||
|FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare, 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?, 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption), | |FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare, 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?, 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption), | ||
|EvidenceBasedPolicy=D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability), | |EvidenceBasedPolicy=D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability), | ||
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* A fee to re-register copyright in IRC would limit the number of re-registrations and may lead to less works in copyright overall, leading to greater social welfare for consumers. | * A fee to re-register copyright in IRC would limit the number of re-registrations and may lead to less works in copyright overall, leading to greater social welfare for consumers. | ||
|Description of Data=This study compares two copyright systems: one of fixed term copyright and one of infinitely renewable copyright. The authors propose an economic model to ascertain the optimum level of copyright. The study also utilises a literature review of studies from 1985 to 2005. | |Description of Data=This study compares two copyright systems: one of fixed term copyright and one of infinitely renewable copyright. The authors propose an economic model to ascertain the optimum level of copyright. The study also utilises a literature review of studies from 1985 to 2005. | ||
− | |Data Year=1985 | + | |Data Year=1985-2005 |
|Data Type=Secondary data | |Data Type=Secondary data | ||
|Data Source=Literature review; | |Data Source=Literature review; | ||
Line 37: | Line 28: | ||
|Government or policy=No | |Government or policy=No | ||
|Literature review=No | |Literature review=No | ||
− | |Funded By= | + | |Funded By=Robert William University Research Foundation; |
}} | }} | ||
|Dataset={{Dataset | |Dataset={{Dataset |
Revision as of 14:34, 8 October 2016
Contents
Source Details
Yuan (2006) | |
Title: | A better copyright system? Comparing welfare of indefinitely renewable copyright versus fixed-length copyright |
Author(s): | Michael Y. Yuan |
Year: | 2006 |
Citation: | Yuan, Michael Y. A better copyright system? comparing welfare of indefinitely renewable copyright versus fixed-length copyright. Econ. Innov. New Techn. 15.6 (2006): 519-542. |
Link(s): | Definitive Open Access |
Key Related Studies: | |
Discipline: | |
Linked by: |
About the Data | |
Data Description: | This study compares two copyright systems: one of fixed term copyright and one of infinitely renewable copyright. The authors propose an economic model to ascertain the optimum level of copyright. The study also utilises a literature review of studies from 1985 to 2005. |
Data Type: | Secondary data |
Secondary Data Sources: | |
Data Collection Methods: | |
Data Analysis Methods: | |
Industry(ies): | |
Country(ies): | |
Cross Country Study?: | Yes |
Comparative Study?: | Yes |
Literature review?: | No |
Government or policy study?: | No |
Time Period(s) of Collection: |
|
Funder(s): |
|
Abstract
This study models and simulates fixed-length copyright (FLC) and indefinitely renewable copyright (IRC) and compares their social welfare. Evidence is found suggesting that IRC has lower maximal social welfare than FLC does. This difference can be explained by the way copyright duration is determined. Copyright duration represents the balance between encouraging creation and reducing restrictions on the consumption of information products. Under FLC, copyright duration is chosen directly by legislation; under IRC, it is induced indirectly through a copyright fee. However, the imposition of a copyright fee distorts the behavior of creators and thus decreases social welfare.
Main Results of the Study
This study models the market of information products under FLC and under IRC. The models describe competition in both creation and production of information products and capture the decisions on pricing, number of first-copy products, and entry of creators. The simulations showthat IRC can increase social welfare if the copyright length ofFLCis not set optimally and is within certain range of excessive length. However, if both FLC and IRC can be configured optimally, then IRC reduces social welfare. It is suggested that IRC is the third-best solution and FLC is the second-best solution to the problem of high creative cost and low reproduction cost of information products. Under FLC, copyright length is set directly to balance the needs of encouraging creation and reducing restrictions on consumption. IRC attempts to indirectly induce a copyright length through a copyright fee. However, the fee distorts the behavior of the creators.
Policy Implications as Stated By Author
- Fixed length copyright (FLC) may have higher social welfare than Infinitely Renewable Copyright (IRC) if FLC is configured optimally (at far lower than the current life plus 70 years in many jurisdictions).
- A fee to re-register copyright in IRC would limit the number of re-registrations and may lead to less works in copyright overall, leading to greater social welfare for consumers.
Coverage of Study
Datasets
Sample size: | 2 |
Level of aggregation: | Copyright systems |
Period of material under study: | 1985 to 2005 |