Depken and Simmons (2004)

Source Details

Depken and Simmons (2004)
Title:	Social construct and the propensity for software piracy
Author(s):	Depken, C. A., Simmons, L. C.
Year:	2004
Citation:	C. A. Depken II & L. C. Simmons (2004) Social construct and the propensity for software piracy, Applied Economics Letters, 11:2, 97-100.
Link(s):	Definitive
Key Related Studies:	Simmons (1999) Marron and Steel (2000) Hofstede (1997)
Discipline:	O33: Technological Change: Choices and Consequences • Diffusion Processes O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
Linked by:	Bezmen and Depken (2006)

About the Data
Data Description:	The data describe 65 countries from 1994 and were obtained from the Business Software Alliance (1995), the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Monetary Fund.
Data Type:	Secondary data
Secondary Data Sources:	Business Software Alliance Central Intelligence Agency International Monetary Fund
Data Collection Methods:	Web analytic (online user trace data)
Data Analysis Methods:	Descriptive statistics (counting; means reporting; cross-tabulation) Correlation and Association
Industry(ies):	Software publishing
Country(ies):	United States
Cross Country Study?:	Yes
Comparative Study?:	No
Literature review?:	No
Government or policy study?:	No
Time Period(s) of Collection:	1994-2004
Funder(s):	None

Abstract

This study offers evidence that cross-country variation in software piracy is a combination of both traditional economic influences and institutional social mores. Software piracy rates are related to various economic variables and two measures of social construct. The study includes an individualism score, which measures horizontal social relationships, and a measure of power distance, measuring vertical social relationships. It is found that economic variables do play a role in the decision to pirate software and that increased power-distance, or the further individuals feel from their superiors, for example law enforcement officials, the greater the propensity to pirate software.

Main Results of the Study

This study extends the existing analysis by including an index that captures the structure of a country’s society and several economic variables thought to influence the decision to pirate software or not by showing that traditional economic variables are important in the (aggregate) decision to pirate software or not. More specifically, this study shows that:

• The propensity of certain countries to consistently expropriate software at a greater rate than other countries may have more to do with social construct.

• While economic variables seem to explain a portion of the cross-country variation in software piracy, also included in this study is the individualism score, the power distance measure and their interaction.

Policy Implications as Stated By Author

Efforts to enforce property rights across national borders may have limited impact if traditional economic choice variables are the focus of enforcement.

Coverage of Study

Coverage of Fundamental Issues

Issue	Included within Study
Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare
Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?
Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors)
Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption)
Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)

Coverage of Evidence Based Policies

Issue	Included within Study
Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right)
Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction)
Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing)
Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability)
Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts)
Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Datasets

Sample size:	65
Level of aggregation:	Country
Period of material under study:	1994-2004