Gopal and Sanders (1997)
|Gopal and Sanders (1997)|
|Title:||Preventive and Deterrent Controls for Software Piracy|
|Author(s):||Gopal, R. D., Sanders, G. L.|
|Citation:||Gopal, R. D., & Sanders, G. L. (1997). Preventive and deterrent controls for software piracy. Journal of Management Information Systems, 29-47.|
|Key Related Studies:|
|Linked by:||Andrés (2006b), Banerjee, Khalid and Sturm (2005), Bhattacharjee, Gopal, Lertwachara and Marsden (2006b), Forman (2010), Gupta, Gould and Pola (2004), Hashim, Kannan, Maximiano and Rees (2012), Holm (2001), Hui and Png (2003), Roark (2010)|
|About the Data|
|Data Description:||Four items were used to operationalize the club size, including hypothetical behavioral scenarios describing an individual making illegal copies for him or herself at home, for a family member, for a friend, and for other colleagues. A sheet was developed with deterrence information, as well as a scale for ethical values. Researchers tested both male and female individuals from 19 and older.
Researchers developed two sets of questionnaires. One questionnaire contained the one-page sheet with deterrence information, items for measuring club size, and items for determining ethical index and demographics. The other set contained the same variables, with the exception of the deterrence information.
Questionnaires were randomly distributed to 130 MBA students. The final sample contained 123 usable responses, with 61 of the questionnaires containing the deterrence information.
|Data Type:||Primary data|
|Secondary Data Sources:|
|Data Collection Methods:|
|Data Analysis Methods:|
|Cross Country Study?:||No|
|Government or policy study?:||No|
|Time Period(s) of Collection:||
In an attempt to protect their intellectual property and compete effectively in an increasingly dynamic marketplace, software publishers have employed a number of preventive and deterrent controls to counter software piracy. Conventional wisdom suggests that reducing piracy will force consumers to acquire software legitimately, thus increasing firm profits. We develop an analytical model to test the implications of antipiracy measures on publisher profits. Our results suggest that preventive control decrease profits and deterrent controls can potentially increase profits. Empirical results are also presented that support the proposition on the impact of deterrent controls on the extent of software piracy derived from the analytical model.
Main Results of the Study
- Results suggest that preventive controls do not increase publisher profits, while deterrent controls can have a positive effect on profitability.
Policy Implications as Stated By Author
- Traditional economists assume that ethics has no role in economic behavior, which would mean ethics have no effect on the formation of software clubs. However, findings that ethical levels have a significant effect on club size dispute this.
Coverage of Study
|Level of aggregation:||Students|
|Period of material under study:||Not stated|