Sinha and Mandel (2008)

From Copyright EVIDENCE

Advertising Architectural Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing Programming and broadcasting Computer programming Computer consultancy Creative, arts and entertainment Cultural education

Film and motion pictures Sound recording and music publishing Photographic activities PR and communication Software publishing (including video games) Specialised design Television programmes Translation and interpretation

1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)? 3. Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors) 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption) 5. Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)

A. Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right) B. Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction) C. Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing) D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability) E. Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts) F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Source Details

Sinha and Mandel (2008)
Title: Preventing digital music piracy: The carrot or the stick?
Author(s): Sinha, R. K., Mandel, N.
Year: 2008
Citation: Sinha, R. K., & Mandel, N. (2008). Preventing digital music piracy: the carrot or the stick?. Journal of Marketing, 72(1), 1-15.
Link(s): Definitive
Key Related Studies:
Discipline:
Linked by: Shanahan and Hyman (2010), Taylor, Ishida and Wallace (2009)
About the Data
Data Description: The data are derived from 3 individual studies conducted in 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively.

The main objective of the studies are to measure factors influencing Willingness to Pay (WTP) for music among the sample.

Although the studies take the form of surveys of students they are highly experimental in nature. Prior to taking part in the survey the participants are exposed to a number of news stories about illegal downloading that present it variously as a low, medium and high risk activity.

Data Type: Primary data
Secondary Data Sources:
Data Collection Methods:
Data Analysis Methods:
Industry(ies):
Country(ies):
Cross Country Study?: No
Comparative Study?: No
Literature review?: No
Government or policy study?: No
Time Period(s) of Collection:
  • 2004-2006
Funder(s):

Abstract

The goal of this article is to ascertain the factors that govern consumers’ willingness to pirate a digital product, such as a digital music track. The authors assess the tendency to pirate with both indirect measures (e.g., willingness to pay for the legal alternative) and direct measures (e.g., piracy preference). Whether measured indirectly or directly, the tendency to pirate depends, to different extents, on three key factors: positive incentives (e.g., improved functionality of the legal Web site), negative incentives (e.g., perceived risk of piracy), and consumer characteristics. Based on three studies, the results suggest that negative incentives are a strong deterrent for certain consumers but can actually increase piracy tendencies for others. Conversely, positive incentives, such as improved functionality, can significantly reduce the tendency to pirate among all the consumer segments studied. The authors conclude by discussing prescriptive recommendations for the recording industry.

Main Results of the Study

The main results of this study are:

  • RIAA’s efforts to use fear and shame to stop digital piracy may be effective only for certain segments of consumers.
  • Negative incentives are a strong deterrent for certain consumers but can actually increase piracy tendencies for others.
  • For consumers with high levels of optimum stimulation (and, thus, higher tolerance for risk), increasing the perceived risk might actually backfire by slightly increasing their likelihood to pirate.
  • Companies can decrease piracy behaviour by offering their music on legal, pay Web sites that offer enhanced features, such as a user-friendly environment, live concerts, and downloadable ringtones.
  • When these upgraded features are present, potential pirates do not allow other variables, such as risk and exploratory behaviour, to influence their piracy decision.

Policy Implications as Stated By Author

The authors state that enhanced functionality and features may increase willingness to pay, "We recommend that the RIAA make additional efforts to work with legal Web sites to make such features available."


Coverage of Study

Coverage of Fundamental Issues
Issue Included within Study
Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare
Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?
Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors)
Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption)
Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)
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Coverage of Evidence Based Policies
Issue Included within Study
Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right)
Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction)
Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing)
Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability)
Green-tick.png
Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts)
Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)
Green-tick.png

Datasets

Sample size: 386
Level of aggregation: University students
Period of material under study: 2004


Sample size: 359
Level of aggregation: University students
Period of material under study: 2005


Sample size: 165
Level of aggregation: University students
Period of material under study: 2006