Difference between revisions of "Bae and Choi (2006)"
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|Source={{Source | |Source={{Source | ||
|Name of Study=Bae and Choi (2006) | |Name of Study=Bae and Choi (2006) | ||
− | |Author= | + | |Author=Bae, S. H.; Choi, J. P.; |
|Title=A Model of Piracy | |Title=A Model of Piracy | ||
|Year=2005 | |Year=2005 | ||
Line 9: | Line 9: | ||
on software usage and the long-run effects on development incentives. We consider two types of costs associated with piracy: the reproduction cost that is constant across users and the degradation cost that is proportional to consumers’ valuation of the original product. We show that the effects of piracy depend crucially on the nature of piracy costs. Policy implications concerning copyright protection are also discussed. | on software usage and the long-run effects on development incentives. We consider two types of costs associated with piracy: the reproduction cost that is constant across users and the degradation cost that is proportional to consumers’ valuation of the original product. We show that the effects of piracy depend crucially on the nature of piracy costs. Policy implications concerning copyright protection are also discussed. | ||
|Authentic Link=http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167624506000278 | |Authentic Link=http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167624506000278 | ||
− | |Reference=Novos and Waldman (1984); Johnstone (1985); Yoon (2001); Harbaugh and Khemka (2001); | + | |Reference=Novos and Waldman (1984);Johnstone (1985);Yoon (2001);Harbaugh and Khemka (2001); |
− | |Plain Text Proposition=We demonstrate that with the threat of piracy the monopolist’s price is lowered, and | + | |Plain Text Proposition=We demonstrate that with the threat of piracy the monopolist’s price is lowered, and usageof an authorized copy is increased in both regimes with positive welfare implications. Thisresult provides a sharp contrast to the common claims of copyright holders, in which thepossibility of piracy reduces demand for a legal copy. |
− | + | |FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare,4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption) | |
− | + | |EvidenceBasedPolicy=F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness) | |
− | |||
− | |FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare, 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption) | ||
− | |EvidenceBasedPolicy=F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness) | ||
|Discipline=L1: Market Structure; Firm Strategy; and Market Performance, L82: Entertainment • Media, L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital | |Discipline=L1: Market Structure; Firm Strategy; and Market Performance, L82: Entertainment • Media, L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital | ||
− | |Intervention-Response=* | + | |Intervention-Response=* An increase in the level of piracy can lead to an increase in demand for the legitimate good. |
− | * This is in opposition to what many copyright holders argue | + | * This is in opposition to what many copyright holders argue. |
− | |Description of Data= | + | |Description of Data=This study considers the two types of costs associated with piracy: the reproduction cost that is constant across users and the degradation cost that is proportional to consumers’ valuation of the original product. The authors demonstrate that the effects of piracy depend crucially on the nature of piracy costs. The study also uses data on piracy levels published by the Business Software Alliance from 2004. |
|Data Year=1991 to 2007 | |Data Year=1991 to 2007 | ||
|Data Type=Secondary data | |Data Type=Secondary data | ||
Line 25: | Line 22: | ||
|Method of Collection=Quantitative Collection Methods, Quantitative data/text mining, Qualitative Collection Methods, Case Study | |Method of Collection=Quantitative Collection Methods, Quantitative data/text mining, Qualitative Collection Methods, Case Study | ||
|Method of Analysis=Quantitative Analysis Methods, Quantitative content analysis (e.g. text or data mining) | |Method of Analysis=Quantitative Analysis Methods, Quantitative content analysis (e.g. text or data mining) | ||
− | |Industry=Software | + | |Industry=Software publishing; |
|Country=Global; | |Country=Global; | ||
|Cross-country=Yes | |Cross-country=Yes | ||
|Comparative=Yes | |Comparative=Yes | ||
|Government or policy=No | |Government or policy=No | ||
− | |Literature review= | + | |Literature review=No |
}} | }} | ||
|Dataset={{Dataset | |Dataset={{Dataset | ||
|Sample Size=2 | |Sample Size=2 | ||
− | |Level of Aggregation=Two types of costs associated with piracy | + | |Level of Aggregation=Two types of costs associated with piracy |
|Data Material Year=1991 - to 2007 | |Data Material Year=1991 - to 2007 | ||
}}{{Dataset | }}{{Dataset | ||
|Sample Size=1 | |Sample Size=1 | ||
− | |Level of Aggregation= | + | |Level of Aggregation=Piracy data |
|Data Material Year=2004 | |Data Material Year=2004 | ||
}} | }} | ||
}} | }} |
Latest revision as of 07:39, 3 November 2022
Contents
Source Details
Bae and Choi (2006) | |
Title: | A Model of Piracy |
Author(s): | Bae, S. H., Choi, J. P. |
Year: | 2005 |
Citation: | Bae, Sang Hoo, and Jay Pil Choi. A model of piracy. Information Economics and Policy 18.3 (2006): 303-320. |
Link(s): | Definitive |
Key Related Studies: | |
Discipline: | |
Linked by: | Moores (2010) |
About the Data | |
Data Description: | This study considers the two types of costs associated with piracy: the reproduction cost that is constant across users and the degradation cost that is proportional to consumers’ valuation of the original product. The authors demonstrate that the effects of piracy depend crucially on the nature of piracy costs. The study also uses data on piracy levels published by the Business Software Alliance from 2004. |
Data Type: | Secondary data |
Secondary Data Sources: | |
Data Collection Methods: | |
Data Analysis Methods: | |
Industry(ies): | |
Country(ies): | |
Cross Country Study?: | Yes |
Comparative Study?: | Yes |
Literature review?: | No |
Government or policy study?: | No |
Time Period(s) of Collection: |
|
Funder(s): |
Abstract
This paper develops a simple model of software piracy to analyze the short-run effects of piracy on software usage and the long-run effects on development incentives. We consider two types of costs associated with piracy: the reproduction cost that is constant across users and the degradation cost that is proportional to consumers’ valuation of the original product. We show that the effects of piracy depend crucially on the nature of piracy costs. Policy implications concerning copyright protection are also discussed.
Main Results of the Study
We demonstrate that with the threat of piracy the monopolist’s price is lowered, and usageof an authorized copy is increased in both regimes with positive welfare implications. Thisresult provides a sharp contrast to the common claims of copyright holders, in which thepossibility of piracy reduces demand for a legal copy.
Policy Implications as Stated By Author
- An increase in the level of piracy can lead to an increase in demand for the legitimate good.
- This is in opposition to what many copyright holders argue.
Coverage of Study
Datasets
Sample size: | 2 |
Level of aggregation: | Two types of costs associated with piracy |
Period of material under study: | 1991 - to 2007 |
Sample size: | 1 |
Level of aggregation: | Piracy data |
Period of material under study: | 2004 |