Difference between revisions of "Banerjee, Banerjee and Raychaudhuri (2008)"
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|Source={{Source | |Source={{Source | ||
|Name of Study=Banerjee, Banerjee and Raychaudhuri (2008) | |Name of Study=Banerjee, Banerjee and Raychaudhuri (2008) | ||
− | |Author= | + | |Author=Banerjee, D.; Banerjee, T.; Raychaudhuri, A. |
|Title=Optimal Enforcement and Anti-Copying Strategies to Counter Copyright Infringement | |Title=Optimal Enforcement and Anti-Copying Strategies to Counter Copyright Infringement | ||
|Year=2008 | |Year=2008 | ||
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Our findings suggest that in countries such as India and China where enforcement policies are rather weak, it is possible to prevent copyright infringement through the adoption of anti-copying investment by producers. | Our findings suggest that in countries such as India and China where enforcement policies are rather weak, it is possible to prevent copyright infringement through the adoption of anti-copying investment by producers. | ||
|Authentic Link=http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2008.00424.x/abstract | |Authentic Link=http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2008.00424.x/abstract | ||
− | |Reference=Besen and Kirby (1989); Takeyama (1994); Parker and Scotchmer (2005); | + | |Reference=Besen and Kirby (1989);Takeyama (1994);Parker and Scotchmer (2005); |
− | |Plain Text Proposition=The monopolist’s strategies consisted of output and anti-copying investment that either allowed or deterred the fake producer’s entry, or prohibited copying with certainty. We called them the accommodating, aggressive and no copying strategies. The government’s social welfare maximizing monitoring rate endogenously determined the monopolist’s subgame perfect equilibrium strategy. | + | |Plain Text Proposition=The monopolist’s strategies consisted of output and anti-copying investment that either allowed or deterred the fake producer’s entry, or prohibited copying with certainty. We called them the accommodating, aggressive and no copying strategies. The government’s social welfare maximizing monitoring rate endogenously determined the monopolist’s subgame perfect equilibrium strategy.We showed that if monitoring is not socially optimal then either the accommodating or the no copying strategies are the subgame perfect equilibrium. In the former case the equilibrium anti-copying investment does not guarantee the prevention of copying while in the latter case copying is prevented with certainty. If monitoring is socially optimal then the accommodating strategy is the subgame perfect equilibrium and copying is notprevented with certainty.In our model the government is responsible for detecting copyright infringement. Alternatively,firms may initiate the detection procedure.Promotion of socioeconomic institutions may be an alternative to detection and anti-copying strategies to reduce copyright infringement. |
− | We showed that if monitoring is not socially optimal then either the accommodating or the no copying strategies are the subgame perfect equilibrium. In the former case the equilibrium anti-copying investment does not guarantee the prevention of copying while in the latter case copying is prevented with certainty. If monitoring is socially optimal then the accommodating strategy is the subgame perfect equilibrium and copying is | + | |FundamentalIssue=5. Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media),1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare,2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)? |
− | + | |EvidenceBasedPolicy=F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness) | |
− | In our model the government is responsible for detecting copyright infringement. Alternatively, | ||
− | firms may initiate the detection procedure. | ||
− | Promotion of socioeconomic institutions may be an alternative to detection and anti-copying strategies to reduce copyright infringement. | ||
− | |FundamentalIssue=5. Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media), 1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare, 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)? | ||
− | |EvidenceBasedPolicy=F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness) | ||
|Discipline=K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law, L11: Production; Pricing; and Market Structure • Size Distribution of Firms | |Discipline=K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law, L11: Production; Pricing; and Market Structure • Size Distribution of Firms | ||
− | |Intervention-Response=* Previous literature had examined pirated or fake goods as imperfect copies of the original competing with the original good | + | |Intervention-Response=* Previous literature had examined pirated or fake goods as imperfect copies of the original competing with the original good.* With digital technology copies are now identical to the original and the consumer cannot tell the difference.* In addition to government-led enforcement, producers can also contribute to enforcement by adopting technical measures that make the original good impossible to copy. |
− | * With digital technology copies are now identical to the original and the consumer cannot tell the difference | + | |Description of Data=This study compares two different copyright enforcement models: one utilising government-led monitoring and the other utilising producer-led technological enforcement through Digital Rights Management. The study utilises a literature review of 13 previous empirical studies. The study also uses sales data from the Indian Music Industry. |
− | * In addition to government-led enforcement, producers can also contribute to enforcement by adopting technical measures that make the original good impossible to copy | + | |Data Year=1988 to 2008 |
− | |Description of Data= | ||
− | |Data Year= | ||
|Data Type=Secondary data | |Data Type=Secondary data | ||
− | |Data Source=Indian Music Industry (IMI); | + | |Data Source=Indian Music Industry (IMI);Review of Existing Academic and Industries Literature; |
|Method of Collection=Qualitative Collection Methods, Case Study | |Method of Collection=Qualitative Collection Methods, Case Study | ||
|Method of Analysis=Quantitative Analysis Methods, Quantitative content analysis (e.g. text or data mining) | |Method of Analysis=Quantitative Analysis Methods, Quantitative content analysis (e.g. text or data mining) | ||
− | |Industry=Film and motion pictures; | + | |Industry=Film and motion pictures; Sound recording and music publishing; |
− | |Country=India; China; | + | |Country=India;China; |
|Cross-country=Yes | |Cross-country=Yes | ||
|Comparative=Yes | |Comparative=Yes | ||
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|Dataset={{Dataset | |Dataset={{Dataset | ||
|Sample Size=2 | |Sample Size=2 | ||
− | |Level of Aggregation=copyright enforcement models | + | |Level of Aggregation=copyright enforcement models |
− | |Data Material Year= | + | |Data Material Year=1988 to 2005 |
+ | }}{{Dataset | ||
+ | |Sample Size=1 | ||
+ | |Level of Aggregation=Music sales data | ||
+ | |Data Material Year=1988 to 2005 | ||
}} | }} | ||
}} | }} |
Latest revision as of 07:49, 4 June 2020
Contents
Source Details
Banerjee, Banerjee and Raychaudhuri (2008) | |
Title: | Optimal Enforcement and Anti-Copying Strategies to Counter Copyright Infringement |
Author(s): | Banerjee, D., Banerjee, T., Raychaudhuri, A. |
Year: | 2008 |
Citation: | Banerjee, Dyuti S., and Ajitava Raychaudhuri. OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT AND ANTI‐COPYING STRATEGIES TO COUNTER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. Japanese Economic Review 59.4 (2008): 519-535. |
Link(s): | Definitive |
Key Related Studies: | |
Discipline: | |
Linked by: |
About the Data | |
Data Description: | This study compares two different copyright enforcement models: one utilising government-led monitoring and the other utilising producer-led technological enforcement through Digital Rights Management. The study utilises a literature review of 13 previous empirical studies. The study also uses sales data from the Indian Music Industry. |
Data Type: | Secondary data |
Secondary Data Sources: | |
Data Collection Methods: | |
Data Analysis Methods: | |
Industry(ies): | |
Country(ies): | |
Cross Country Study?: | Yes |
Comparative Study?: | Yes |
Literature review?: | No |
Government or policy study?: | No |
Time Period(s) of Collection: |
|
Funder(s): |
Abstract
In this paper we study the mix of anti-copying investment strategies by an incumbent firm and the enforcement policies of a government that consists of monitoring and penalizing the copier to address the issue of commercial piracy. If monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti-copying investment does not guarantee the prevention of copying. If not monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti-copying investment may guarantee the prevention of copying. Our findings suggest that in countries such as India and China where enforcement policies are rather weak, it is possible to prevent copyright infringement through the adoption of anti-copying investment by producers.
Main Results of the Study
The monopolist’s strategies consisted of output and anti-copying investment that either allowed or deterred the fake producer’s entry, or prohibited copying with certainty. We called them the accommodating, aggressive and no copying strategies. The government’s social welfare maximizing monitoring rate endogenously determined the monopolist’s subgame perfect equilibrium strategy.We showed that if monitoring is not socially optimal then either the accommodating or the no copying strategies are the subgame perfect equilibrium. In the former case the equilibrium anti-copying investment does not guarantee the prevention of copying while in the latter case copying is prevented with certainty. If monitoring is socially optimal then the accommodating strategy is the subgame perfect equilibrium and copying is notprevented with certainty.In our model the government is responsible for detecting copyright infringement. Alternatively,firms may initiate the detection procedure.Promotion of socioeconomic institutions may be an alternative to detection and anti-copying strategies to reduce copyright infringement.
Policy Implications as Stated By Author
- Previous literature had examined pirated or fake goods as imperfect copies of the original competing with the original good.* With digital technology copies are now identical to the original and the consumer cannot tell the difference.* In addition to government-led enforcement, producers can also contribute to enforcement by adopting technical measures that make the original good impossible to copy.
Coverage of Study
Datasets
Sample size: | 2 |
Level of aggregation: | copyright enforcement models |
Period of material under study: | 1988 to 2005 |
Sample size: | 1 |
Level of aggregation: | Music sales data |
Period of material under study: | 1988 to 2005 |