Difference between revisions of "Banerjee, Banerjee and Raychaudhuri (2008)"
From Copyright EVIDENCE
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|EvidenceBasedPolicy=F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness), | |EvidenceBasedPolicy=F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness), | ||
|Discipline=K4: Legal Procedure; the Legal System; and Illegal Behavior, K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law, L1: Market Structure; Firm Strategy; and Market Performance, L11: Production; Pricing; and Market Structure • Size Distribution of Firms | |Discipline=K4: Legal Procedure; the Legal System; and Illegal Behavior, K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law, L1: Market Structure; Firm Strategy; and Market Performance, L11: Production; Pricing; and Market Structure • Size Distribution of Firms | ||
+ | |Method of Collection=Qualitative Collection Methods, Case Study | ||
+ | |Method of Analysis=Quantitative Analysis Methods, Quantitative content analysis (e.g. text or data mining) | ||
+ | |Industry=Film and motion pictures; Creative, arts and entertainment; | ||
+ | |Country=India; | ||
|Cross-country=No | |Cross-country=No | ||
|Comparative=No | |Comparative=No |
Revision as of 07:26, 8 April 2016
Contents
Source Details
Banerjee, Banerjee and Raychaudhuri (2008) | |
Title: | Optimal Enforcement and Anti-Copying Strategies to Counter Copyright Infringement |
Author(s): | Dyuti Banerjee, Tanmoyee Banerjee and Ajitava Raychaudhuri |
Year: | 2008 |
Citation: | Banerjee, Dyuti S., and Ajitava Raychaudhuri. OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT AND ANTI‐COPYING STRATEGIES TO COUNTER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. Japanese Economic Review 59.4 (2008): 519-535. |
Link(s): | Definitive |
Key Related Studies: | |
Discipline: | |
Linked by: |
About the Data | |
Data Description: | |
Data Type: | |
Secondary Data Sources: | |
Data Collection Methods: | |
Data Analysis Methods: | |
Industry(ies): | |
Country(ies): | |
Cross Country Study?: | No |
Comparative Study?: | No |
Literature review?: | No |
Government or policy study?: | No |
Time Period(s) of Collection: | |
Funder(s): |
Abstract
In this paper we study the mix of anti-copying investment strategies by an incumbent firm and the enforcement policies of a government that consists of monitoring and penalizing the copier to address the issue of commercial piracy. If monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti-copying investment does not guarantee the prevention of copying. If not monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti-copying investment may guarantee the prevention of copying.
Main Results of the Study
Policy Implications as Stated By Author