Banerjee, Banerjee and Raychaudhuri (2008)

Source Details

Banerjee, Banerjee and Raychaudhuri (2008)
Title:	Optimal Enforcement and Anti-Copying Strategies to Counter Copyright Infringement
Author(s):	Dyuti Banerjee, Tanmoyee Banerjee and Ajitava Raychaudhuri
Year:	2008
Citation:	Banerjee, Dyuti S., and Ajitava Raychaudhuri. OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT AND ANTI‐COPYING STRATEGIES TO COUNTER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. Japanese Economic Review 59.4 (2008): 519-535.
Link(s):	Definitive
Key Related Studies:	Besen and Kirby (1989) Takeyama (1994) Parker and Scotchmer (2005)
Discipline:	K4: Legal Procedure; the Legal System; and Illegal Behavior K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law L1: Market Structure; Firm Strategy; and Market Performance L11: Production; Pricing; and Market Structure • Size Distribution of Firms
Linked by:

About the Data
Data Description:
Data Type:
Secondary Data Sources:
Data Collection Methods:	Qualitative Collection Methods Case Study
Data Analysis Methods:	Quantitative Analysis Methods Quantitative content analysis (e.g. text or data mining)
Industry(ies):	Film and motion pictures Creative, arts and entertainment
Country(ies):	India
Cross Country Study?:	No
Comparative Study?:	Yes
Literature review?:	No
Government or policy study?:	No
Time Period(s) of Collection:
Funder(s):

Abstract

In this paper we study the mix of anti-copying investment strategies by an incumbent firm and the enforcement policies of a government that consists of monitoring and penalizing the copier to address the issue of commercial piracy. If monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti-copying investment does not guarantee the prevention of copying. If not monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti-copying investment may guarantee the prevention of copying.

Coverage of Study

Coverage of Fundamental Issues

Issue	Included within Study
Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare
Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?
Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors)
Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption)
Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)

Coverage of Evidence Based Policies

Issue	Included within Study
Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right)
Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction)
Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing)
Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability)
Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts)
Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)