Difference between revisions of "Belleflamme (2002)"
From Copyright EVIDENCE
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|Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=333323 | |Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=333323 | ||
|Reference=Novos and Wladman (1984); Liebowitz (1985); Besen and Kirby (1989); Watt (2000); | |Reference=Novos and Wladman (1984); Liebowitz (1985); Besen and Kirby (1989); Watt (2000); | ||
− | |Plain Text Proposition=* Copying reduces the overall profits of the producer, but increases the availability of | + | |Plain Text Proposition=* Copying reduces the overall profits of the producer, but increases the availability of goods at a cheaper price to the consumer. |
* Therefore overall copying leads to an increase in social welfare | * Therefore overall copying leads to an increase in social welfare | ||
|FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare, 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption), 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?, | |FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare, 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption), 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?, | ||
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|Method of Collection=Quantitative Collection Methods, Quantitative data/text mining, Qualitative Collection Methods, Case Study | |Method of Collection=Quantitative Collection Methods, Quantitative data/text mining, Qualitative Collection Methods, Case Study | ||
|Method of Analysis=Quantitative Analysis Methods, Quantitative content analysis (e.g. text or data mining) | |Method of Analysis=Quantitative Analysis Methods, Quantitative content analysis (e.g. text or data mining) | ||
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|Country=Global; | |Country=Global; | ||
|Cross-country=Yes | |Cross-country=Yes |
Revision as of 10:48, 1 January 2017
Contents
Source Details
Belleflamme (2002) | |
Title: | Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying |
Author(s): | Paul Belleflamme |
Year: | 2002 |
Citation: | Belleflamme, Paul. Pricing information goods in the presence of copying. U of London Queen Mary Economics Working Paper 463 (2002). |
Link(s): | Definitive , Open Access |
Key Related Studies: | |
Discipline: | |
Linked by: | Belleflamme, Omrani and Peitz (2015) |
About the Data | |
Data Description: | This study uses no original data but is a review of existing literature to analyse two models of copying: one where there is marginal or no cost to the producer and one where there is a cost significant enough to make copying inefficient. Using this analysis the study then determines the effects of copying on social welfare. |
Data Type: | |
Secondary Data Sources: | |
Data Collection Methods: | |
Data Analysis Methods: | |
Industry(ies): | |
Country(ies): | |
Cross Country Study?: | Yes |
Comparative Study?: | Yes |
Literature review?: | Yes |
Government or policy study?: | No |
Time Period(s) of Collection: | |
Funder(s): |
Abstract
The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model a la Mussa-Rosen (1978). When the copying technology involves a marginal cost and no fixed cost, producers act independently. In this simple framework, we highlight the trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency considerations (how to provide the right incentives to create whilst limiting monopoly distortions?). When the copying technology involves a fixed cost and no marginal cost, pricing decisions are interdependent. We investigate the strategic pricing game by focussing on some significant symmetric Nash equilibria.
Main Results of the Study
- Copying reduces the overall profits of the producer, but increases the availability of goods at a cheaper price to the consumer.
- Therefore overall copying leads to an increase in social welfare
Policy Implications as Stated By Author
- Information goods can be protected by IP laws but the existence of such laws does not on its own guarantee protection
- Technical measures (such as DRM) can also protect goods but are also imperfect and can be 'cracked'
- As a result, illegal copying (piracy) cannot be completely avoided
- It is there important to understand how copying affects the demand for legitimate information goods and the pricing strategy of their producers
- It is also important from a policy perspective to understand the social welfare implications of copying
Coverage of Study
Datasets
Sample size: | 2 |
Level of aggregation: | Models of copying |
Period of material under study: | 1981 to 2001 |