Difference between revisions of "Belleflamme (2002)"

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|Source={{Source
 
|Source={{Source
 
|Name of Study=Belleflamme (2002)
 
|Name of Study=Belleflamme (2002)
|Author=Paul Belleflamme
+
|Author=Belleflamme, P.;
 
|Title=Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying
 
|Title=Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying
 
|Year=2002
 
|Year=2002
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|Authentic Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=333323
 
|Authentic Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=333323
 
|Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=333323
 
|Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=333323
|Reference=Novos and Wladman (1984); Liebowitz (1985); Besen and Kirby (1989); Watt (2000);
+
|Reference=Novos and Wladman (1984);Liebowitz (1985);Besen and Kirby (1989);Watt (2000);
|Plain Text Proposition=* Copying reduces the overall profits of the producer, but increases the availability of good.s at a cheaper price to the consumer.
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|Plain Text Proposition=* Copying reduces the overall profits of the producer, but increases the availability of goods at a cheaper price to the consumer.* Therefore overall copying leads to an increase in social welfare
* Therefore overall copying leads to an increase in social welfare
+
|FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare,4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption),2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?
|FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare, 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption), 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?,
+
|EvidenceBasedPolicy=F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)
|EvidenceBasedPolicy=F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness),
 
 
|Discipline=L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets, L82: Entertainment • Media, L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
 
|Discipline=L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets, L82: Entertainment • Media, L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
|Intervention-Response=* Information goods can be protected by IP laws but the existence of such laws does not on its own guarantee protection  
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|Intervention-Response=* Information goods can be protected by IP laws but the existence of such laws does not on its own guarantee protection * Technical measures (such as DRM) can also protect goods but are also imperfect and can be 'cracked'  * As a result, illegal copying (piracy) cannot be completely avoided* It is there important to understand how copying affects the demand for legitimate information goods and the pricing strategy of their producers* It is also important from a policy perspective to understand the social welfare implications of copying
* Technical measures (such as DRM) can also protect goods but are also imperfect and can be 'cracked'   
+
|Description of Data=This study uses no original data but is a review of existing literature to analyse two models of copying: one where there is marginal or no cost to the producer and one where there is a cost significant enough to make copying inefficient. Using this analysis the study then determines the effects of copying on social welfare.
* As a result, illegal copying (piracy) cannot be completely avoided
 
* It is there important to understand how copying affects the demand for legitimate information goods and the pricing strategy of their producers
 
* It is also important from a policy perspective to understand the social welfare implications of copying
 
|Description of Data=This study uses a review of existing literature to analyse two models of copying: one where there is marginal or no cost to the producer and one where there is a cost significant enough to make copying inefficient. Using this analysis the study then determines the effects of copying on social welfare.
 
|Data Year=1981 to 2001
 
|Data Type=Secondary data
 
 
|Data Source=Review of Existing Academic and Industries Literature;
 
|Data Source=Review of Existing Academic and Industries Literature;
 
|Method of Collection=Quantitative Collection Methods, Quantitative data/text mining, Qualitative Collection Methods, Case Study
 
|Method of Collection=Quantitative Collection Methods, Quantitative data/text mining, Qualitative Collection Methods, Case Study
 
|Method of Analysis=Quantitative Analysis Methods, Quantitative content analysis (e.g. text or data mining)
 
|Method of Analysis=Quantitative Analysis Methods, Quantitative content analysis (e.g. text or data mining)
|Industry=Software publishing (including video games); Creative, arts and entertainment; Film and motion pictures; Sound recording and music publishing;
 
 
|Country=Global;
 
|Country=Global;
 
|Cross-country=Yes
 
|Cross-country=Yes
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|Dataset={{Dataset
 
|Dataset={{Dataset
 
|Sample Size=2
 
|Sample Size=2
|Level of Aggregation=Models of copying,
+
|Level of Aggregation=Models of copying
|Data Material Year=1981 to 2001
 
}}{{Dataset
 
|Sample Size=26
 
|Level of Aggregation=Empirical studies,
 
 
|Data Material Year=1981 to 2001
 
|Data Material Year=1981 to 2001
 
}}
 
}}
 
}}
 
}}

Latest revision as of 07:50, 26 May 2020

Advertising Architectural Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing Programming and broadcasting Computer programming Computer consultancy Creative, arts and entertainment Cultural education Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities

Film and motion pictures Sound recording and music publishing Photographic activities PR and communication Software publishing Video game publishing Specialised design Television programmes Translation and interpretation

1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)? 3. Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors) 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption) 5. Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)

A. Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right) B. Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction) C. Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing) D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability) E. Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts) F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Source Details

Belleflamme (2002)
Title: Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying
Author(s): Belleflamme, P.
Year: 2002
Citation: Belleflamme, Paul. Pricing information goods in the presence of copying. U of London Queen Mary Economics Working Paper 463 (2002).
Link(s): Definitive , Open Access
Key Related Studies:
Discipline:
Linked by: Belleflamme, Omrani and Peitz (2015)
About the Data
Data Description: This study uses no original data but is a review of existing literature to analyse two models of copying: one where there is marginal or no cost to the producer and one where there is a cost significant enough to make copying inefficient. Using this analysis the study then determines the effects of copying on social welfare.
Data Type:
Secondary Data Sources:
Data Collection Methods:
Data Analysis Methods:
Industry(ies):
Country(ies):
Cross Country Study?: Yes
Comparative Study?: Yes
Literature review?: Yes
Government or policy study?: No
Time Period(s) of Collection:
Funder(s):

Abstract

The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model a la Mussa-Rosen (1978). When the copying technology involves a marginal cost and no fixed cost, producers act independently. In this simple framework, we highlight the trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency considerations (how to provide the right incentives to create whilst limiting monopoly distortions?). When the copying technology involves a fixed cost and no marginal cost, pricing decisions are interdependent. We investigate the strategic pricing game by focussing on some significant symmetric Nash equilibria.

Main Results of the Study

  • Copying reduces the overall profits of the producer, but increases the availability of goods at a cheaper price to the consumer.* Therefore overall copying leads to an increase in social welfare


Policy Implications as Stated By Author

  • Information goods can be protected by IP laws but the existence of such laws does not on its own guarantee protection * Technical measures (such as DRM) can also protect goods but are also imperfect and can be 'cracked' * As a result, illegal copying (piracy) cannot be completely avoided* It is there important to understand how copying affects the demand for legitimate information goods and the pricing strategy of their producers* It is also important from a policy perspective to understand the social welfare implications of copying



Coverage of Study

Coverage of Fundamental Issues
Issue Included within Study
Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare
Green-tick.png
Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?
Green-tick.png
Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors)
Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption)
Green-tick.png
Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)
Coverage of Evidence Based Policies
Issue Included within Study
Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right)
Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction)
Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing)
Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability)
Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts)
Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)
Green-tick.png

Datasets

Sample size: 2
Level of aggregation: Models of copying
Period of material under study: 1981 to 2001