Difference between revisions of "Belleflamme (2002)"
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|Abstract=The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model a la Mussa-Rosen (1978). When the copying technology involves a marginal cost and no fixed cost, producers act independently. In this simple framework, we highlight the trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency considerations (how to provide the right incentives to create whilst limiting monopoly distortions?). When the copying technology involves a fixed cost and no marginal cost, pricing decisions are interdependent. We investigate the strategic pricing game by focussing on some significant symmetric Nash equilibria. | |Abstract=The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model a la Mussa-Rosen (1978). When the copying technology involves a marginal cost and no fixed cost, producers act independently. In this simple framework, we highlight the trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency considerations (how to provide the right incentives to create whilst limiting monopoly distortions?). When the copying technology involves a fixed cost and no marginal cost, pricing decisions are interdependent. We investigate the strategic pricing game by focussing on some significant symmetric Nash equilibria. | ||
|Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=333323 | |Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=333323 | ||
+ | |Reference=Novos and Wladman (1984); Liebowitz (1985); Besen and Kirby (1989); Watt (2000); | ||
|Discipline=K1: Basic Areas of Law, K11: Property Law, L1: Market Structure; Firm Strategy; and Market Performance, L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets, L8: Industry Studies: Services, L82: Entertainment • Media, L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software, O3: Technological Change • Research and Development • Intellectual Property Rights, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital | |Discipline=K1: Basic Areas of Law, K11: Property Law, L1: Market Structure; Firm Strategy; and Market Performance, L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets, L8: Industry Studies: Services, L82: Entertainment • Media, L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software, O3: Technological Change • Research and Development • Intellectual Property Rights, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital | ||
+ | |Industry=Software publishing (including video games); Creative, arts and entertainment; Film and motion pictures; Sound recording and music publishing; | ||
|Cross-country=No | |Cross-country=No | ||
|Comparative=No | |Comparative=No |
Revision as of 22:25, 8 April 2016
Contents
Source Details
Belleflamme (2002) | |
Title: | Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying |
Author(s): | Paul Belleflamme |
Year: | 2002 |
Citation: | Belleflamme, Paul. Pricing information goods in the presence of copying. U of London Queen Mary Economics Working Paper 463 (2002). |
Link(s): | , Open Access |
Key Related Studies: | |
Discipline: | |
Linked by: | Belleflamme, Omrani and Peitz (2015) |
About the Data | |
Data Description: | |
Data Type: | |
Secondary Data Sources: | |
Data Collection Methods: | |
Data Analysis Methods: | |
Industry(ies): | |
Country(ies): | |
Cross Country Study?: | No |
Comparative Study?: | No |
Literature review?: | No |
Government or policy study?: | No |
Time Period(s) of Collection: | |
Funder(s): |
Abstract
The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model a la Mussa-Rosen (1978). When the copying technology involves a marginal cost and no fixed cost, producers act independently. In this simple framework, we highlight the trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency considerations (how to provide the right incentives to create whilst limiting monopoly distortions?). When the copying technology involves a fixed cost and no marginal cost, pricing decisions are interdependent. We investigate the strategic pricing game by focussing on some significant symmetric Nash equilibria.