Difference between revisions of "Belleflamme (2002)"
From Copyright EVIDENCE
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|Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=333323 | |Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=333323 | ||
|Reference=Novos and Wladman (1984); Liebowitz (1985); Besen and Kirby (1989); Watt (2000); | |Reference=Novos and Wladman (1984); Liebowitz (1985); Besen and Kirby (1989); Watt (2000); | ||
+ | |Plain Text Proposition=* Copying reduces the overall profits of the producer, but increases the availability of goods at a cheaper price to the consumer | ||
+ | * Therefore overall copying leads to an increase in social welfare | ||
+ | |FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare, 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption), 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?, | ||
+ | |EvidenceBasedPolicy=F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness), | ||
|Discipline=K1: Basic Areas of Law, K11: Property Law, L1: Market Structure; Firm Strategy; and Market Performance, L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets, L8: Industry Studies: Services, L82: Entertainment • Media, L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software, O3: Technological Change • Research and Development • Intellectual Property Rights, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital | |Discipline=K1: Basic Areas of Law, K11: Property Law, L1: Market Structure; Firm Strategy; and Market Performance, L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets, L8: Industry Studies: Services, L82: Entertainment • Media, L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software, O3: Technological Change • Research and Development • Intellectual Property Rights, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital | ||
+ | |Intervention-Response=* Information goods can be protected by IP laws but the existence of such laws does not on its own guarantee protection | ||
+ | * Technical measures (such as DRM) can also protect goods but are also imperfect and can be 'cracked' | ||
+ | * As a result, illegal copying (piracy) cannot be completely avoided | ||
+ | * It is there important to understand how copying affects the demand for legitimate information goods and the pricing strategy of their producers | ||
+ | * It is also important from a policy perspective to understand the social welfare implications of copying | ||
+ | |Description of Data=Literature review | ||
+ | |Data Year=1981 to 2001 | ||
+ | |Method of Collection=Quantitative Collection Methods, Quantitative data/text mining, Qualitative Collection Methods, Case Study | ||
+ | |Method of Analysis=Quantitative Analysis Methods, Quantitative content analysis (e.g. text or data mining) | ||
|Industry=Software publishing (including video games); Creative, arts and entertainment; Film and motion pictures; Sound recording and music publishing; | |Industry=Software publishing (including video games); Creative, arts and entertainment; Film and motion pictures; Sound recording and music publishing; | ||
|Cross-country=No | |Cross-country=No | ||
|Comparative=No | |Comparative=No | ||
|Government or policy=No | |Government or policy=No | ||
− | |Literature review= | + | |Literature review=Yes |
}} | }} | ||
|Dataset= | |Dataset= | ||
}} | }} |
Revision as of 22:43, 8 April 2016
Contents
Source Details
Belleflamme (2002) | |
Title: | Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying |
Author(s): | Paul Belleflamme |
Year: | 2002 |
Citation: | Belleflamme, Paul. Pricing information goods in the presence of copying. U of London Queen Mary Economics Working Paper 463 (2002). |
Link(s): | , Open Access |
Key Related Studies: | |
Discipline: | |
Linked by: | Belleflamme, Omrani and Peitz (2015) |
About the Data | |
Data Description: | Literature review |
Data Type: | |
Secondary Data Sources: | |
Data Collection Methods: | |
Data Analysis Methods: | |
Industry(ies): | |
Country(ies): | |
Cross Country Study?: | No |
Comparative Study?: | No |
Literature review?: | Yes |
Government or policy study?: | No |
Time Period(s) of Collection: |
|
Funder(s): |
Abstract
The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model a la Mussa-Rosen (1978). When the copying technology involves a marginal cost and no fixed cost, producers act independently. In this simple framework, we highlight the trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency considerations (how to provide the right incentives to create whilst limiting monopoly distortions?). When the copying technology involves a fixed cost and no marginal cost, pricing decisions are interdependent. We investigate the strategic pricing game by focussing on some significant symmetric Nash equilibria.
Main Results of the Study
- Copying reduces the overall profits of the producer, but increases the availability of goods at a cheaper price to the consumer
- Therefore overall copying leads to an increase in social welfare
Policy Implications as Stated By Author
- Information goods can be protected by IP laws but the existence of such laws does not on its own guarantee protection
- Technical measures (such as DRM) can also protect goods but are also imperfect and can be 'cracked'
- As a result, illegal copying (piracy) cannot be completely avoided
- It is there important to understand how copying affects the demand for legitimate information goods and the pricing strategy of their producers
- It is also important from a policy perspective to understand the social welfare implications of copying