Difference between revisions of "Charles River Associates (2014)"
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|Link=http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/1403_study1_en.pdf | |Link=http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/1403_study1_en.pdf | ||
|Reference=IFPI (2013); OECD (2005); KEA (2012); | |Reference=IFPI (2013); OECD (2005); KEA (2012); | ||
+ | |Plain Text Proposition=#1 The study identifies several key mechanisms through which the proposed scenarios are likely to affect total welfare. These mechanisms can be broadly categorised into three groups: (1) the use of vertical agreements to affect the interaction between parties within the vertical supply chain and between vertical supply chains, (2) price discrimination and (3) transaction costs. | ||
|FundamentalIssue=4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption), | |FundamentalIssue=4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption), | ||
|EvidenceBasedPolicy=D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability), | |EvidenceBasedPolicy=D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability), | ||
|Discipline=L51: Economics of Regulation, L82: Entertainment • Media | |Discipline=L51: Economics of Regulation, L82: Entertainment • Media | ||
+ | |Intervention-Response=Because theoretical models are highly stylised abstractions of reality, no single model matches the reality of the relevant markets perfectly. In such circumstances, it is particularly unlikely that economic theory would provide uniform predictions of the effects of different policy options. Moreover, the relevant mechanisms discussed under the headings of Vertical Agreements and Price Discrimination often have ambiguous effect. This implies that theory alone is unlikely to give strong predictions. Nevertheless, it can inform us about the sources of risks and potential benefits associated with the different | ||
+ | policy options. | ||
+ | |Description of Data=Theoretical economic analysis | ||
|Data Type=Secondary data | |Data Type=Secondary data | ||
|Method of Collection=Quantitative data/text mining, Qualitative content/text mining | |Method of Collection=Quantitative data/text mining, Qualitative content/text mining |
Revision as of 22:36, 10 January 2016
Contents
Source Details
Charles River Associates (2014) | |
Title: | Economic Analysis of the Territoriality of the Making Available Right in the EU |
Author(s): | Charles River Associates |
Year: | 2014 |
Citation: | Charles River Associates, Economic Analysis of the Territoriality of the Making Available Right in the EU (2014). |
Link(s): | Definitive , Open Access |
Key Related Studies: | |
Discipline: | |
Linked by: |
About the Data | |
Data Description: | Theoretical economic analysis |
Data Type: | Secondary data |
Secondary Data Sources: | |
Data Collection Methods: | |
Data Analysis Methods: | |
Industry(ies): | |
Country(ies): | |
Cross Country Study?: | Yes |
Comparative Study?: | No |
Literature review?: | No |
Government or policy study?: | Yes |
Time Period(s) of Collection: | |
Funder(s): |
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Abstract
In the European Union, the protection of copyright and related rights is territorial in the sense that these rights are provided by national laws and their geographical scope is limited to the territory of the state granting them. As a result, enforcement of rights occurs on a country-by-country-basis. With respect to online on-demand uses of their creative works, authors of music and audiovisual works as well as holders of related rights enjoy an exclusive right of making their works available online to the public “in such a way that members of the public can access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them”. In practice, online on-demand services also often involve a relevant act of reproduction of copyright protected works which entails the clearance of a second type of right, namely the reproduction right.
Some stakeholders have suggested that the current copyright regime makes the clearance of rights for cross-border online uses an unnecessarily complex as well as resource-consuming process. Multinational service providers indeed often have to negotiate required rights separately for several territories since licensing content on a territory-by-territory basis (territorial licensing) appears to be a common practice in Europe. This arguably raises barriers to cross-border online access and prevents the online sphere from realising the full economic potential associated with the borderless nature of the internet.
In this report, we take territorial licensing as consisting of rightholders exercising the territorial nature of copyright by limiting the geographical scope of the rights granted to licensee to a proper subset of EU Member States within a particular transaction. In line with this definition, the territorial nature of copyright is in itself not a sufficient condition for territorial licensing to take place. Indeed, the decisions of licensors to restrict the geographical scope of licences (i.e. to license on a territory-by-territory basis), are based on private motivations and depend on the wider institutional context, not only on the territorial nature of copyright. This report analyses the private motivations underlying the choice of territorial licensing in the current institutional framework in order, in a nutshell, to answer the following question: would a limitation to the practice of territorial licensing improve social welfare? The report focuses on two kinds of copyright-protected works, recorded music and audiovisual works.
Main Results of the Study
- 1 The study identifies several key mechanisms through which the proposed scenarios are likely to affect total welfare. These mechanisms can be broadly categorised into three groups: (1) the use of vertical agreements to affect the interaction between parties within the vertical supply chain and between vertical supply chains, (2) price discrimination and (3) transaction costs.
Policy Implications as Stated By Author
Because theoretical models are highly stylised abstractions of reality, no single model matches the reality of the relevant markets perfectly. In such circumstances, it is particularly unlikely that economic theory would provide uniform predictions of the effects of different policy options. Moreover, the relevant mechanisms discussed under the headings of Vertical Agreements and Price Discrimination often have ambiguous effect. This implies that theory alone is unlikely to give strong predictions. Nevertheless, it can inform us about the sources of risks and potential benefits associated with the different policy options.