David (1993)

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Advertising Architectural Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing Programming and broadcasting Computer programming Computer consultancy Creative, arts and entertainment Cultural education Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities

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1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)? 3. Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors) 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption) 5. Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)

A. Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right) B. Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction) C. Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing) D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability) E. Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts) F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Source Details

David (1993)
Title: Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda’ s Thumb: Patents , Copyrights and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History
Author(s): David, P. A.
Year: 1993
Citation: David, P. A. 1993. “Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda’ s Thumb: Patents , Copyrights and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History”, in M. Wallerstein, M. Mogee and R. Schoen (eds .), Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology . Washington DC: National Academy Press; 19-61.
Link(s): Open Access
Key Related Studies:
Discipline:
Linked by:
About the Data
Data Description: the author uses data from the WIPO and OTA. He also sites evidence from a number of other papers .
Data Type: Secondary data
Secondary Data Sources:
Data Collection Methods:
Data Analysis Methods:
Industry(ies):
Country(ies):
Cross Country Study?: No
Comparative Study?: No
Literature review?:
Government or policy study?:
Time Period(s) of Collection:
  • Pre 1990
Funder(s):

Abstract

The author offeres his insights regarding the use of patent, copyright, and trade secrets to encourage innovation. He Brings sets out the historical background of the different IPR's and analyses the effects of the different IPR systems in the modern economy.

Main Results of the Study

The author discussed the historical evolution of property rights and continued onto discuss the history of intellectual property in terms of patents and copyrights.

Author notes that on a global scale developing countries would benefit from weak IPR's.

The author concluded with 4 main observations regarding the effect of government sanctioned monopolies.

  1. Patent rights can interfere with further discovery as its diverts resources into "racing" and inventing around the basic patent and discourages complementary inventions.
  2. Weak and Narrow patents encourage firms to cross-license thus disseminating findings rapidly, although might discourage efforts for radical, fundamental inventions.
  3. Weak patent protection regimes encourage exchanges of patent licences among firms that are symmetrical in technological capabilities, the opposite is more likely when transfers of technical know-how from more to less capable organizations.
  4. Intellectual property rights in the form of exclusive franchise guarantees can fix the problem of failure to exploit a patent.

Should be noted that problems with complements and licensing exists with copyright

Policy Implications as Stated By Author

Need ot be careful when creating IPR regimes in order to maximise social welfare

Coverage of Study

Coverage of Fundamental Issues
Issue Included within Study
Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare
Green-tick.png
Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?
Green-tick.png
Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors)
Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption)
Green-tick.png
Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)
Coverage of Evidence Based Policies
Issue Included within Study
Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right)
Green-tick.png
Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction)
Green-tick.png
Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing)
Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability)
Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts)
Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Datasets