Difference between revisions of "Handke and Towse (2007)"

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|Discipline=D2: Production and Organizations, D23: Organizational Behavior • Transaction Costs • Property Rights, D4: Market Structure and Pricing, D42: Monopoly, L3: Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise, L31: Nonprofit Institutions • NGOs
 
|Discipline=D2: Production and Organizations, D23: Organizational Behavior • Transaction Costs • Property Rights, D4: Market Structure and Pricing, D42: Monopoly, L3: Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise, L31: Nonprofit Institutions • NGOs
 
|Industry=Sound recording and music publishing; Creative, arts and entertainment;
 
|Industry=Sound recording and music publishing; Creative, arts and entertainment;
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|Country=European Union;
 
|Cross-country=No
 
|Cross-country=No
 
|Comparative=No
 
|Comparative=No
|Government or policy=No
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|Government or policy=Yes
 
|Literature review=No
 
|Literature review=No
 
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|Dataset=
 
|Dataset=
 
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Revision as of 05:51, 7 April 2016

Advertising Architectural Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing Programming and broadcasting Computer programming Computer consultancy Creative, arts and entertainment Cultural education Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities

Film and motion pictures Sound recording and music publishing Photographic activities PR and communication Software publishing Video game publishing Specialised design Television programmes Translation and interpretation

1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)? 3. Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors) 4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption) 5. Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)

A. Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right) B. Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction) C. Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing) D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability) E. Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts) F. Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Source Details

Handke and Towse (2007)
Title: Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies
Author(s): Christian Handke and Ruth Towse
Year: 2007
Citation: Handke, Christian, and Ruth Towse. Economics of copyright collecting societies. International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 38.8 (2007): 937-957.
Link(s): , Open Access
Key Related Studies:
Discipline:
Linked by: Kretschmer (2011), Towse (2017)
About the Data
Data Description:
Data Type:
Secondary Data Sources:
Data Collection Methods:
Data Analysis Methods:
Industry(ies):
Country(ies):
Cross Country Study?: No
Comparative Study?: No
Literature review?: No
Government or policy study?: Yes
Time Period(s) of Collection:
Funder(s):

Abstract

Economists have long recognised that copyright collecting societies (CCS), i.e. organisations that specialise on administering "copyrights held by a large number of owners", play a fundamental role in the copyright system. Indeed, the economic literature explains why without such organisations, copyright law would be ineffective in some markets for copyrighted works: the majority of authors and users would not be able to grant or obtain permission to use many works of art, literature, music, film and other such works that copyright law protects. In economic terms, CCS enable markets to function for the use of copyright works in situations in which the copyright holder cannot contract directly with the user. But because many markets for copyright works have changed rapidly over recent years, we should ask under which circumstances CCS would continue to play a constructive, maybe even essential, role. It has been argued many times that technical solutions to digital rights management (DRM) will render CCS obsolete as the market for copyrights shifts online and policy-makers such as the European Commission have begun to scrutinise the role played by CCS in the dynamic market for copyrighted media content online (REC 2005/737/EC). The purpose of this survey of the specialised economic literature is to take stock and to identify possible gaps in the understanding of the economics of CCS and to advocate attention to this literature in contemporary debates about them.

Main Results of the Study

Policy Implications as Stated By Author


Coverage of Study

Coverage of Fundamental Issues
Issue Included within Study
Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare
Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)?
Harmony of interest assumption between authors and publishers (creators and producers/investors)
Green-tick.png
Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption)
Green-tick.png
Understanding consumption/use (e.g. determinants of unlawful behaviour; user-generated content; social media)
Coverage of Evidence Based Policies
Issue Included within Study
Nature and Scope of exclusive rights (hyperlinking/browsing; reproduction right)
Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction)
Mass digitisation/orphan works (non-use; extended collective licensing)
Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability)
Green-tick.png
Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts)
Enforcement (quantifying infringement; criminal sanctions; intermediary liability; graduated response; litigation and court data; commercial/non-commercial distinction; education and awareness)

Datasets