Difference between revisions of "Kretschmer (2011)"
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|Authentic Link=https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310183/ipresearch-faircomp-201110.pdf | |Authentic Link=https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310183/ipresearch-faircomp-201110.pdf | ||
|Link=https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310183/ipresearch-faircomp-201110.pdf | |Link=https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310183/ipresearch-faircomp-201110.pdf | ||
| − | |Reference=Handke and Towse (2007); Hargreaves (2011); Liebowitz and Watt (2006); | + | |Reference=Handke and Towse (2007);Hargreaves (2011);Liebowitz and Watt (2006); |
| − | |Plain Text Proposition=There are dramatic differences between countries in the methodology used for identifying leviable devices, setting tariffs, and allocating beneficiaries of the levy. There are levies on blank media in 22 EU countries, on MP3 players in 18 countries, on printers in 12 countries, on personal computers in 4 countries. Revenues collected per capita vary between €0.02 (Romania) and €2.6 (France). The distribution of levy revenues to recording artists is less than €0.01 per album. | + | |Plain Text Proposition=There are dramatic differences between countries in the methodology used for identifying leviable devices, setting tariffs, and allocating beneficiaries of the levy. There are levies on blank media in 22 EU countries, on MP3 players in 18 countries, on printers in 12 countries, on personal computers in 4 countries. Revenues collected per capita vary between €0.02 (Romania) and €2.6 (France). The distribution of levy revenues to recording artists is less than €0.01 per album.These variations cannot be explained by an underlying concept of economic harm to rightholders from private copying.The scope of consumer permissions under the statutory exceptions for private copying within the EU vary, and generally do not match with what consumers ordinarily understand as private activities.In levy countries, the costs of levies as an indirect tax are not always passed on to the consumer. In competitive markets, such as those for printers, manufacturers of levied goods appear to absorb the levy. There appears to be a pan-European retail price range for many consumer devices regardless of levy schemes (with the exception of Scandinavia).In non-levy countries, such as the UK, a certain amount of private copying is already priced into retail purchases. For example, right holders have either explicitly permitted acts of format shifting, or decided not to enforce their exclusive rights. Commercial practice will not change as a result of introducing a narrowly conceived private copying exception. A more widely conceived exception that would cover private activities that take place in digital networks (such as downloading for personal use, or non-commercial adaptation and distribution within networks of friends) may be best understood not as an exception but as a statutory licence. Such a licence could include state regulated payments with levy characteristics as part of a wider overhaul of the copyright system, facilitating the growth of new digital services. |
| − | These variations cannot be explained by an underlying concept of economic harm to rightholders from private copying. | + | |FundamentalIssue=4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption),1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare |
| − | The scope of consumer permissions under the statutory exceptions for private copying within the EU vary, and generally do not match with what consumers ordinarily understand as private activities. | + | |EvidenceBasedPolicy=D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability),E. Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts),B. Exceptions (distinguish innovation and public policy purposes; open-ended/closed list; commercial/non-commercial distinction) |
| − | In levy countries, the costs of levies as an indirect tax are not always passed on to the consumer. In competitive markets, such as those for printers, manufacturers of levied goods appear to absorb the levy. There appears to be a pan-European retail price range for many consumer devices regardless of levy schemes (with the exception of Scandinavia). | ||
| − | In non-levy countries, such as the UK, a certain amount of private copying is already priced into retail purchases. For example, right holders have either explicitly permitted acts of format shifting, or decided not to enforce their exclusive rights. Commercial practice will not change as a result of introducing a narrowly conceived private copying exception. | ||
| − | A more widely conceived exception that would cover private activities that take place in digital networks (such as downloading for personal use, or non-commercial adaptation and distribution within networks of friends) may be best understood not as an exception but as a statutory licence. Such a licence could include state regulated payments with levy characteristics as part of a wider overhaul of the copyright system, facilitating the growth of new digital services. | ||
| − | |FundamentalIssue=4. Effects of protection on industry structure (e.g. oligopolies; competition; economics of superstars; business models; technology adoption), 1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare | ||
| − | |EvidenceBasedPolicy=D. Licensing and Business models (collecting societies; meta data; exchanges/hubs; windowing; crossborder availability), E. Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts), | ||
|Discipline=K12: Contract Law, K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital | |Discipline=K12: Contract Law, K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital | ||
| − | |Cross-country= | + | |Intervention-Response=Reviews of the intellectual property system in the digital environment will not be successful until copyright practice meets with a minimum of acceptance. Economically and socially, minimum acceptance entails that creators are willing to create; that publishers and producers are willing to invest; and that consumers remain willing to buy (and that assumes that they understand some form of legal exclusion as justified).For the UK, a key question is if new exceptions, or changes to the scope of exceptions and limitations, can be introduced without triggering the European requirement of fair compensation, and therefore an assessment of harm.49 A second question relates to the effects of European levy schemes on the Single Market, and how the UK might respond to any proposed regulation of the European copyright system. There appears to be no economic case for adding another layer of licensing on copyright transactions if limited to the narrow meaning of private copying covered by the “first sale” argument. Within the constraints of EU law, the UK’s economically efficient option appears to be the de minimis argument (= no harm): a certain amount of copying in already priced into the first retail purchase. The discussion of a statutory licence, or a voluntary licence under state supervision, moves beyond allocative efficiency to consumer issues (including higher norms of privacy), and the reward of creators (equity in distribution). The arguments for a levy scheme of fair compensation here are distinct, but overlap in complex ways with the justification for copyright itself. |
| − | |Comparative= | + | |Description of Data=The study takes its data from several sources, including submissions from 7 of the key stakeholder collecting societies and representative bodies in the copyright industries. The UK IPO held a discussion group with stakeholders. Annual reports from several collecting societies were used and also documentation from the European Commission's consultations on copyright reform. |
| − | |Government or policy= | + | |Data Year=2006 to 2010 |
| − | |Literature review= | + | |Data Type=Secondary data |
| + | |Data Source=European Commission;Nokia;Copyright Levies Reform Alliance;YOUNISON; | ||
| + | |Method of Collection=Quantitative Collection Methods, Quantitative data/text mining, Qualitative Collection Methods, Qualitative content/text mining | ||
| + | |Method of Analysis=Quantitative Analysis Methods, Quantitative content analysis (e.g. text or data mining), Qualitative Analysis Methods, Legal Analysis | ||
| + | |Industry=Creative, arts and entertainment; | ||
| + | |Country=European Union | ||
| + | |Cross-country=Yes | ||
| + | |Comparative=Yes | ||
| + | |Government or policy=Yes | ||
| + | |Literature review=Yes | ||
| + | |Funded By=Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) (grant RES-173-27-0220) | ||
}} | }} | ||
| − | |||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 14:12, 21 October 2021
Contents
Source Details
| Kretschmer (2011) | |
| Title: | Private Copying and Fair Compensation: An empirical study of copyright levies in Europe |
| Author(s): | Kretschmer, M. |
| Year: | 2011 |
| Citation: | Kretschmer, M. (2011). Private copying and fair compensation |
| Link(s): | Definitive , Open Access |
| Key Related Studies: | |
| Discipline: | |
| Linked by: | Camerani, Grassano, Chavarro and Tang (2013) |
| About the Data | |
| Data Description: | The study takes its data from several sources, including submissions from 7 of the key stakeholder collecting societies and representative bodies in the copyright industries. The UK IPO held a discussion group with stakeholders. Annual reports from several collecting societies were used and also documentation from the European Commission's consultations on copyright reform. |
| Data Type: | Secondary data |
| Secondary Data Sources: | |
| Data Collection Methods: | |
| Data Analysis Methods: | |
| Industry(ies): | |
| Country(ies): | |
| Cross Country Study?: | Yes |
| Comparative Study?: | Yes |
| Literature review?: | Yes |
| Government or policy study?: | Yes |
| Time Period(s) of Collection: |
|
| Funder(s): |
|
Abstract
Following the Information Society Directive of 2001 (introducing the concept of “fair compensation” for private copying into EU Law), total collection from levies on copying media and equipment in the EU tripled, from about €170m to more than €500m per annum. Levy schemes exist now in 22 out of 27 Member States (with only the UK, Ireland, Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg remaining outside). Despite their wide adoption, levy systems are little understood, both in respect of their rationale and their economic consequences. Tariffs are increasingly contested in court, leading to a large gap between claimed and collected revenues. The European Commission has announced “comprehensive legislative action” for 2012. This report offers the first independent empirical assessment of the European levy system as a whole. The research consolidates the evidence on levy setting, collection and distribution; reviews the scope of consumer permissions associated with levy payments; and reports the results of three product level studies (printer/scanners, portable music/video/game devices, and tablet computers), analysing the relationship between VAT, levy tariffs and retail prices in 20 levy and non-levy countries.
Main Results of the Study
There are dramatic differences between countries in the methodology used for identifying leviable devices, setting tariffs, and allocating beneficiaries of the levy. There are levies on blank media in 22 EU countries, on MP3 players in 18 countries, on printers in 12 countries, on personal computers in 4 countries. Revenues collected per capita vary between €0.02 (Romania) and €2.6 (France). The distribution of levy revenues to recording artists is less than €0.01 per album.These variations cannot be explained by an underlying concept of economic harm to rightholders from private copying.The scope of consumer permissions under the statutory exceptions for private copying within the EU vary, and generally do not match with what consumers ordinarily understand as private activities.In levy countries, the costs of levies as an indirect tax are not always passed on to the consumer. In competitive markets, such as those for printers, manufacturers of levied goods appear to absorb the levy. There appears to be a pan-European retail price range for many consumer devices regardless of levy schemes (with the exception of Scandinavia).In non-levy countries, such as the UK, a certain amount of private copying is already priced into retail purchases. For example, right holders have either explicitly permitted acts of format shifting, or decided not to enforce their exclusive rights. Commercial practice will not change as a result of introducing a narrowly conceived private copying exception. A more widely conceived exception that would cover private activities that take place in digital networks (such as downloading for personal use, or non-commercial adaptation and distribution within networks of friends) may be best understood not as an exception but as a statutory licence. Such a licence could include state regulated payments with levy characteristics as part of a wider overhaul of the copyright system, facilitating the growth of new digital services.
Policy Implications as Stated By Author
Reviews of the intellectual property system in the digital environment will not be successful until copyright practice meets with a minimum of acceptance. Economically and socially, minimum acceptance entails that creators are willing to create; that publishers and producers are willing to invest; and that consumers remain willing to buy (and that assumes that they understand some form of legal exclusion as justified).For the UK, a key question is if new exceptions, or changes to the scope of exceptions and limitations, can be introduced without triggering the European requirement of fair compensation, and therefore an assessment of harm.49 A second question relates to the effects of European levy schemes on the Single Market, and how the UK might respond to any proposed regulation of the European copyright system. There appears to be no economic case for adding another layer of licensing on copyright transactions if limited to the narrow meaning of private copying covered by the “first sale” argument. Within the constraints of EU law, the UK’s economically efficient option appears to be the de minimis argument (= no harm): a certain amount of copying in already priced into the first retail purchase. The discussion of a statutory licence, or a voluntary licence under state supervision, moves beyond allocative efficiency to consumer issues (including higher norms of privacy), and the reward of creators (equity in distribution). The arguments for a levy scheme of fair compensation here are distinct, but overlap in complex ways with the justification for copyright itself.
Coverage of Study
Datasets
{{{Dataset}}}
