Difference between revisions of "Buccafusco (2012)"
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|Name of Study=Buccafusco (2012) | |Name of Study=Buccafusco (2012) | ||
− | |Author=Buccafusco, C | + | |Author=Buccafusco, C.; |
|Title=Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law | |Title=Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law | ||
|Year=2012 | |Year=2012 | ||
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|Authentic Link=http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol/733/ | |Authentic Link=http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol/733/ | ||
|Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919210 | |Link=http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919210 | ||
− | |Reference=Buccafusco and Sprigman (2011); Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010); Landes and Posner (2003); Hovenkamp (1991); | + | |Reference=Buccafusco and Sprigman (2011);Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010);Landes and Posner (2003);Hovenkamp (1991); |
− | |Plain Text Proposition=There was one experiment with three different conditions | + | |Plain Text Proposition=* There was one experiment with three different conditions: 1) Contest, 2) Publication, 3) Attribution.* The first condition was the contest condition, where the subjects could sell their rights to win a lottery but keep their property rights. * The second condition (publication) was similar to the contest condition but the difference is that the photographer now had the chance to have their photo published, uncredited, if they sold their contest rights and won the lottery.* The final condition (attribution) is similar to the publication condition except the photographer would have a credited photo published if they sold their rights to the lottery. * The idea being that if the subject had a lower willingness to accept (WTA) an offer then they would be more likely to sell their property rights away, but keep the possibility to publish with or without attribution, depending on the condition. What the authors found was that when the photographer had the potential to publish a photo with attribution their WTA was lower than when there was not a chance to get published with attribution. This result suggests that if authors were not given attribution rights there would be more transactions of artistic works, which would make it a more efficient market. |
− | 1 | + | |FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare,2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)? |
− | 2 | + | |EvidenceBasedPolicy=E. Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts) |
− | 3. | ||
− | |||
− | The first condition was the contest condition, where the subjects could sell their rights to win a lottery but keep their property rights. | ||
− | |||
− | The second condition (publication) was similar to the contest condition but the difference is that the photographer now had the chance to have their photo published, uncredited, if they sold their contest rights and won the lottery. | ||
− | |||
− | The final condition (attribution) is similar to the publication condition except the photographer would have a credited photo published if they sold their rights to the lottery. | ||
− | |||
− | The idea being that if the subject had a lower willingness to accept (WTA) an offer then they would be more likely to sell their property rights away, but keep the possibility to publish with or without attribution, depending on the condition. What the authors found was that when the photographer had the potential to publish a photo with attribution their WTA was lower than when there was not a chance to get published with attribution. This result suggests that if authors were not given attribution rights there would be more transactions of artistic works, which would make it a more efficient market. | ||
− | |FundamentalIssue=1. Relationship between protection (subject matter/term/scope) and supply/economic development/growth/welfare, 2. Relationship between creative process and protection - what motivates creators (e.g. attribution; control; remuneration; time allocation)? | ||
− | |EvidenceBasedPolicy=E. Fair remuneration (levies; copyright contracts) | ||
|Discipline=A1: General Economics, A11: Role of Economics • Role of Economists • Market for Economists, K: Law and Economics, K1: Basic Areas of Law, K11: Property Law, O3: Technological Change • Research and Development • Intellectual Property Rights, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital | |Discipline=A1: General Economics, A11: Role of Economics • Role of Economists • Market for Economists, K: Law and Economics, K1: Basic Areas of Law, K11: Property Law, O3: Technological Change • Research and Development • Intellectual Property Rights, O34: Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital | ||
|Intervention-Response=Makes a case for attribution rights not being a part of copyright protection. | |Intervention-Response=Makes a case for attribution rights not being a part of copyright protection. | ||
|Description of Data=There were three different conditions run with 180 test subjects in total, using mechanical turk (mturk). The contest condition had 60 subjects the publiation condition had 61 and the attribution condition had 59 subjects. | |Description of Data=There were three different conditions run with 180 test subjects in total, using mechanical turk (mturk). The contest condition had 60 subjects the publiation condition had 61 and the attribution condition had 59 subjects. | ||
+ | |Data Year=2011 | ||
|Data Type=Primary data | |Data Type=Primary data | ||
|Method of Collection=Quantitative Collection Methods, Survey Research (quantitative; e.g. sales/income reporting) | |Method of Collection=Quantitative Collection Methods, Survey Research (quantitative; e.g. sales/income reporting) | ||
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|Cross-country=No | |Cross-country=No | ||
|Comparative=No | |Comparative=No | ||
+ | |Government or policy=No | ||
+ | |Literature review=No | ||
}} | }} | ||
|Dataset={{Dataset | |Dataset={{Dataset | ||
|Sample Size=60 | |Sample Size=60 | ||
− | |Level of Aggregation=Individual | + | |Level of Aggregation=Individual |
+ | |Data Material Year=2011 | ||
}}{{Dataset | }}{{Dataset | ||
|Sample Size=61 | |Sample Size=61 | ||
− | |Level of Aggregation=Individual | + | |Level of Aggregation=Individual |
+ | |Data Material Year=2011 | ||
}}{{Dataset | }}{{Dataset | ||
|Sample Size=59 | |Sample Size=59 | ||
− | |Level of Aggregation=Individual | + | |Level of Aggregation=Individual |
+ | |Data Material Year=2011 | ||
}} | }} | ||
}} | }} |
Latest revision as of 14:42, 20 April 2020
Contents
Source Details
Buccafusco (2012) | |
Title: | Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law |
Author(s): | Buccafusco, C. |
Year: | 2012 |
Citation: | Buccafusco, C. J. (2012). Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law. Cornell Law Review, 97, 501. |
Link(s): | Definitive , Open Access |
Key Related Studies: | |
Discipline: | |
Linked by: |
About the Data | |
Data Description: | There were three different conditions run with 180 test subjects in total, using mechanical turk (mturk). The contest condition had 60 subjects the publiation condition had 61 and the attribution condition had 59 subjects. |
Data Type: | Primary data |
Secondary Data Sources: | |
Data Collection Methods: | |
Data Analysis Methods: | |
Industry(ies): | |
Country(ies): | |
Cross Country Study?: | No |
Comparative Study?: | No |
Literature review?: | No |
Government or policy study?: | No |
Time Period(s) of Collection: |
|
Funder(s): |
Abstract
Despite considerable research suggesting that creators value attribution – i.e., being named as the creator of a work – U.S. intellectual property (IP) law does not provide a right to attribution to the vast majority of creators. On the other side of the Atlantic, however, many European countries give creators, at least in their copyright laws, much stronger rights to attribution. At first blush it may seem that the U.S. has gotten it wrong, and the Europeans have made a better policy choice in providing to creators a right that they value. But for reasons we will explain in this Article, matters are a lot more complicated than that.
This Article reports a series of experiments that are the first to attempt to quantitatively measure the value of attribution to creators. In previous research, we have shown that creators of IP are subject to a “creativity effect” that results in them assigning substantially higher value to their works than neoclassical economic theory predicts. The first two experiments reported in this Article suggest a way that the creativity effect may be reduced – creators are willing to sacrifice significant economic payments in favor of receiving attribution for their work. The value to creators of attribution raises the question whether U.S. IP law should be re-structured to provide attribution as a creator’s default right.
The third and most important experiment reported here casts doubt on the value of giving creators such a default right, because creators value attribution differently depending on whether the legal rule gives it to them as an initial entitlement or not. When creators are given a right to attribution as a default they value credit four times higher than when attribution is not the default option. Our findings make clear that creators value attribution, and that the prospect of obtaining it can lead to a more efficient level of transacting. At the same time, and paradoxically, our findings also suggest that before we restructure American law, which provides no right to attribution for the vast majority of creators, we need to take care, because it is possible, under conditions that we will describe, that providing creators with a default right to attribution will result in less efficient transacting.
Finally, our findings have important implications for property theory which are broader than IP law or attribution rights. Our third experiment suggests that a party who enjoys a default legal right as part of her initial complement of rights will tend to treat that legal right in a fashion similar to any other form of initial entitlement, and overvalue it relative to what neoclassical theory would predict. This suggests a principle regarding how to efficiently structure default rules in any setting. All other factors being equal, an efficiently-structured default rule will locate the initial legal entitlement in the party who is either less likely to overvalue the entitlement, or, if overvaluation seems inevitable regardless of where the initial entitlement is placed, is likely to overvalue it less.
Main Results of the Study
- There was one experiment with three different conditions: 1) Contest, 2) Publication, 3) Attribution.* The first condition was the contest condition, where the subjects could sell their rights to win a lottery but keep their property rights. * The second condition (publication) was similar to the contest condition but the difference is that the photographer now had the chance to have their photo published, uncredited, if they sold their contest rights and won the lottery.* The final condition (attribution) is similar to the publication condition except the photographer would have a credited photo published if they sold their rights to the lottery. * The idea being that if the subject had a lower willingness to accept (WTA) an offer then they would be more likely to sell their property rights away, but keep the possibility to publish with or without attribution, depending on the condition. What the authors found was that when the photographer had the potential to publish a photo with attribution their WTA was lower than when there was not a chance to get published with attribution. This result suggests that if authors were not given attribution rights there would be more transactions of artistic works, which would make it a more efficient market.
Policy Implications as Stated By Author
Makes a case for attribution rights not being a part of copyright protection.
Coverage of Study
Datasets
Sample size: | 60 |
Level of aggregation: | Individual |
Period of material under study: | 2011 |
Sample size: | 61 |
Level of aggregation: | Individual |
Period of material under study: | 2011 |
Sample size: | 59 |
Level of aggregation: | Individual |
Period of material under study: | 2011 |